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Introduction 
 
The recent political turmoil in Egypt associated with the Arab Spring led to the removal 
of two heads of state, the establishment of new political parties, and emergency elections. 
However, the Egyptian military was able to navigate the tumultuous political environment and 
maintain its influence over the government and its institutions. While the United States and 
others in the international community expressed concern over the military’s methods to enforce 
law and preserve their political dominance, condemnation was minimal and brief. Now, with the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s recent removal and expulsion from politics, the military stands 
unopposed as the most experienced and well-organized political entity in Egypt.  
Over the course of the last four years, protests sprang up and spread throughout the Arab 
world as oppositions groups voiced their grievances and challenged local regimes. This 
seemingly spontaneously outbreak of violent, popular political protests across the region came to 
be known as “The Arab Spring”. The demonstrations that led to regime change reaffirms many 
concerns Middle Eastern states have regarding internal stability. In Egypt, the population united 
to voice grievances against the government and exact political change. However, the current 
structure of the Egyptian polity and the importance of its stability to the interests of other states 
will prevent the current political landscape from evolving into a true representative government. 
This work will analyze the geopolitical situation of Egypt in the context of the political and 
social changes in the Middle East, and why current developments are conducive to the military’s 
political dominance. 
To examine how geopolitics facilitate the preservation of a military regime in Egypt, this 
work seeks to answer the following questions: How do the political/religious dynamics in the 
region effect government stability? What interests to states have in Egypt’s stability/instability? 
Why is Egypt’s geopolitical context significant in regards to these dynamics? How have external 
state interests influenced internal Egyptian politics, and how does this influence facilitate 
military political dominance? By answering these fundamental questions, this work argues that 
the Egyptian military’s political control is a result of geopolitical conditions and regional 
dynamics that have influenced the military’s political capital within Egyptian society.  
The first question, relating to the region’s political and regional dynamics, raises security 
concerns of states with interests in the Middle East. The Arab Spring revealed a variety of 
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political movements ranging from more secular groups seeking representative government, to 
those with intentions to implement facets of Islamic law. In accordance with their own economic 
and/or security interests, external state actors attempt to influence the internal political dynamics 
within other states to inhibit potential challenges to their own legitimacy. In regards to regional 
dynamics, the third question raises the significance of the location and geography of Egypt with 
the Middle East.  
Communicating the historical context of the region helps the reader understand the 
interests of other states the stability of Egypt, and helps frame the argument regarding the 
possible implications instability could have on the global economy and neighboring regimes. 
After discussing the evolution of the Egyptian state, the work I examines the current 
relationships between the Egyptian military and external state actors. Discussing the types of 
material, financial, and diplomatic aid provides understanding of external interests in Egypt, and 
why the military was able to maintain authority during the political fallout after the removal of 
Mubarak. 
  In order to adequately navigate through the complex series of events that allowed the 
Egyptian military to retain political power, it is essential that the reader refers to the previous 
questions, as they provide the necessary foundation for the following hypothesis: Due to the 
military’s influence over the political and economic infrastructure of the Egyptian state, 
combined with their familiarity of existing regional alliances and security dynamics, they were 
able to navigate the revolution and remain the most influential political entity within the 
Egyptian government. 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
The control of the Egyptian military over the political and economic sectors of society is 
intrinsically linked to its geopolitical context in the region. There is ongoing theoretical debate 
regarding the definitions and applications of terms such as geopolitics, sovereignty, and 
legitimacy. However, for the sake of straightforwardness, this work will use common definitions 
associated with international relations theory. Geopolitics refers to the influence of geography, 
economics, and demography on the politics and foreign policy of a state.1 A state’s geopolitical 
                                                             
1 “Geopolitics.” Merriam-Webster.com. 2015. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/geopolitics 
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context involves the geographic characteristics of the state in relation to population centers, 
available resources, and the sovereign boundaries of other state entities in its proximity. Such 
factors affect state security, internal stability, and external relationships. The state is only a 
sovereign entity if it has the authority and the right to govern.2 If there is a functioning governing 
body, it is able preside over, protect, and mobilize a population to secure its interests. The 
governing body does so by establishing legal authority and institutional infrastructure to promote 
organization and consistency to aid in the management of the population. The government’s 
ability to manage, protect, and mobilize the population depends upon legitimacy. A population’s 
acceptance of, and willingness to adhere to that authority determines the legitimacy of the regime 
and its institutions.3 In inter-state relationships, legitimacy is the recognition between governing 
bodies of one another’s authority, and/or sovereignty over populations and resources within 
specific territorial boundaries.4 A state that fails to secure interests will face economic and 
security vulnerabilities, and the presence of such vulnerabilities can cause a population, and/or 
other states to question the authority of the regime. Thus, stability coincides with internal or 
external challenges to a regime’s legitimacy.5 As the Egyptian regime pursued interests, the 
geopolitical context helped mold institutional infrastructure, as well as state and foreign policy. 
While this work is not specifically about foreign policy, it will adopt a framework similar 
to Raymond Hinnebusch’s modified realism applied in The Foreign Policies of Middle East 
States. In that work, Hinnebusch suggests that analysis of the region requires a modified form of 
realist theory because of several unique factors that prevent any one theory from being flawless 
in its application. The factors include irredentism, suprastate identity, and duality, all of which 
are related geopolitical consequences of the formation of Middle Eastern states, and contribute to 
the broad instability of the region. 6  
 Irredentism is a cultural or historical claim to a region or territory that is now occupied by 
a state, or influenced by an alternative authority. Hinnebusch claims that the root of Irredentism 
is sub-state communities and ethnic groups that spill across state borders, becoming “trans-state” 
                                                             
2 Roberts, John. “Sovereignty.” The Internet Encyclopedia of International Relations.  
http://www.towson.edu/polsci/irencyc/sovreign.htm 
3 Lake, David A. Building Legitimate States after Civil Wars. In. Hoddie, Matthew & Hartzell, Caroline A. ed.  
Strengthening Peace in Post-Civil War States, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2010. p. 31-32, 38. 
4 Ibid, p. 35-36. 
5 Ibid, p. 43-48 
6 Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. The Foreign Policies of the Middle East States, (Lynne  
Rienner Publishers, Inc. Boulder, CO, 2002), p. 5-12 
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communities that often instigate territorial conflict. For example, the Kurdish community is a 
consistent source of regional disruptions because it extends across the northwest of Syria, 
northern Iraq and Iran, and into the south eastern region of Turkey.7  The Palestinians are also a 
community that occupies a non-state territory in the Levant, and conflict between Israel and this 
community is a continuous source of refugees spilling into surrounding states like Egypt, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Jordan. Finally, the presence of Shi’ite communities extending from Iran and much 
of Iraq, bleed into many heavily Sunni states in the Gulf, causing many sectarian conflicts that 
continue to have regional implications.8   
 Hinnebusch suggests that since the state system was more or less imposed on the Middle 
East, much of the pre-existing cultural and linguistic unity still exists, this is Suprastate identity. 
A population’s loyalty and identification with a larger community, like “the Arab World” or the 
Islamic umma, complicates the pillars of sovereignty because policies by one state will indirectly 
influence the internal dynamics within another.9  
 With the presence of suprastate identity and irredentism, ruling elites have to constantly 
form policies that adhere to the demands of their own sovereignty as well as those of the larger 
“Arab” community. Such behavior refers to duality, or a feeling of duty and allegiance towards 
both.10 For security and survival, states cannot ignore or neglect these factors, which follows the 
demands of traditional realist theory. However, history is riddled with instances where Middle 
Eastern states prioritize one over the other, resulting in significant changes in regional dynamics. 
Nassar’s attempt to unify Syria and Egypt was an act that reinforced the “Pan-Arab” identity, as 
did the 1967 war with Israel. Conversely, after each state felt the consequences of continual 
conflict with Israel, they began to act contrary to the “Arab” identity, taking self-serving 
measures to ensure their survival. For Egypt, Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with the Jewish state is 
a primary example.11   
While one can argue that states are reacting to constructed identities, constructivism is 
insufficient because it denies the state quest for survival, and the drive to expand influence and 
power. The theory ignores the fact that military power, not public opinion, forced a shift in 
                                                             
7 Hinnebusch and Ehteshami. The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, p. 7-8 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid, p. 5-12 
10 Ibid, p. 8 
11 Ibid, p. 9 
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regional dynamics during the wars with Israel, causing states like Egypt to abandon identities 
and adopt more realist “self-help” policies.12  
However, traditional realism is also insufficient because it ignores domestic and internal 
factors that result in suprastate identity, irredentism, and duality. In the Middle East, such factors 
cannot be ignored, as they clearly influence the survival of states in the region.13 Realism 
assumes a level of “secure national identity” that is not present in Middle East. Instead, the 
Hinnebusch approach refers to the region as a unique “system of states, mostly linked by power 
and interests.”14   
These conditions create a distinctive regional system where states do operate according to 
interests associated with power and preservation. However, survival often depends on a regime’s 
ability to manage external state relationships, as well as internal pressures that stem from the 
various identities present within the region. As traditional definitions of sovereignty are not 
sufficient in the Middle East due to the factors described above, this framework is adequate 
because enables an examination of Middle Eastern states as rational actors struggling to survive 
threats emanating from internal and external factors. 
 
Literature Review  
 
In the introduction, there are references to the use of a modified version of realism as a 
framework for this project. As mentioned earlier, Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan 
Ehteshami first employ the use of such a framework because of the unique features of the Middle 
Eastern system.15 State actors do act according to their interests and survival; however, their 
legitimacy and sometimes their survival depends upon their reaction to various dynamics within 
the population.  The dynamics are the result of constructed identities among Middle Eastern 
populations that are suprastate, or transcend traditional state boundaries, and many prioritize 
their ethnic, religious, and cultural identities over their state affiliations.  
For states operating in this region, the pursuit of interests is a unique challenge. For 
example, in Egypt, participation in the international community is an adherence to the state 
                                                             
12 Hinnebusch and Ehteshami. The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, p. 9. 
13 Ibid, p. 5-12 
14 Ibid, p. 10 
15 Ibid, p. 2, 19, 21 
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structure recognized by realists, and is essential for economic stability and added security. 
However, domestic stability and legitimacy often relies upon their ability to appease, 
marginalize, reprimand, embrace, and sometimes personify specific suprastate identities that 
exist across the region.16  The challenge for a regime is to understand and act on interests of the 
state, while being privy to domestic dynamics that have an ability to reverberate across sovereign 
boundaries. The result is duality which requires an analysis of how geopolitics mold the foreign 
and domestic policies required to stabilize the state.17  
In 2007, Peter Mandaville’s “Global Political Islam” discusses many of the complexities 
related to some specific identities mentioned earlier. His focus is the evolving relationship 
between religion and politics in the Muslim world, and while religious affiliation is a significant 
suprastate identity that influences policy in the region, Mandaville briefly mentions identities 
regarding nationalistic and ethnic associations as a part of his historical accounts, and recognizes 
that they are also factors that regimes have to consider. However, Mandaville’s focus is not on 
regimes or the state, but rather existing religious identities, their current relationship to politics, 
and the possibility of representative government developing in the region. He is careful to 
describe Muslim politics in terms of the “Muslim world”, rather than confine the realm of 
politics to existing regimes or ruling parties. He argues that an evolution of political ideology is 
taking place in Muslim society, that it is not a phenomenon exclusive to the political arena of 
government, and that representative government will only be achieved through a reconciliation 
between religion and politics, rather than a separation of the two. 
To explain the many ways that Islam influences and infiltrates politics in the Muslim 
world, Mandaville breaks down his work into several sections. First, he provides a brief history 
of the religion on to the point where the region experienced the formation of states. The section 
is important because it describes the conservative roots of the religion, how populations 
consolidated to form communities around their religious traditions, and the religious laws and 
hierarchies that developed to govern those communities. The section will be important for this 
thesis because it provides a foundation for understanding how populations in the region seem to 
prioritize their association with religious identities over their nation-state, and the role religion 
plays in the manipulation of the region’s politics.  
                                                             
16 Hinnebusch, Ehteshami. The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, p. 8-11 
17 Ibid, p. 8 
9 
 
 Mandaville’s next section transitions off the previous by describing Islamism as a 
political strategy, “Islamization from above”, and how Islamism takes root in weak or failed 
states.18 In this way, Mandaville shows religion is used as a tool for leaders in communities, all 
the way up state level, to justify their political position and/or their rule. Today, profound 
evidence of Islamization from above in the Gulf Monarchies and the Mullahs in Iran, while 
Yemen and Afghanistan are great examples of religion being used in weak states to justify 
violent pursuits of political influence and to rally populations behind a political cause. Even in 
authoritarian military regimes like Egypt, the role of religion in politics is a serious debate, and 
the ruling party often attempts to appease this deliberation by incorporating religious leaders or 
aspects of Sharia law into their judicial systems.19  
Both religious and military regimes realize the internal threat from religious 
organizations because of their ability to tap into and address the grievances within communities, 
often promoting their own political agendas while undermining the legitimacy of the regime. In 
failed states, organizations can gain influence by providing much need social welfare services, 
and then use this influence to blame other groups or identities for their condition, use their own 
religious identity to advocate superiority over rivals, and justify pursuits of political control.20 
For the thesis, these sections lend credence to the value populations put on their religious 
identities, and why states in the region cannot afford to ignore organizations that take political 
stances while invoking religious validity.  The sections also provide insight into the various state 
strategies and “duality” regimes use to react to the threats to stability that suprastate identities 
represent. 
 The next segment of Mandaville’s work goes into more detail regarding the various 
strategies religious organizations use to oppose or undermine monarchies, theocracies, and 
military regimes. Mandaville also examines radical Islam, jihad, and Muslim transnationalism.21 
He goes into great detail about religious networks and brotherhoods that unite like-minded 
individuals behind an identity and ideology. With such resources, organizations can focus on 
domestic grievances to gain political influence from within a state, or they can use their religious 
networks to recruit followers all over the world, and embark on ambitious international 
                                                             
18 Mandaville. Global Political Islam, p. 147, 198 
19 Ibid, p. 112 
20 Ibid, p. 199-236 
21 Ibid, p. 237, 275 
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campaigns of violence that target other states or governments that represent opposing ideologies. 
Radical Islam, according to Mandaville, targets capitalist states because of the constant 
encroachment of ideas, products, and symbols, that radicals believe, threaten Islamic traditions 
by corrupting their religious ideals.22 Mandaville, perhaps unknowingly, reveals how 
organizations use whatever resources they have to act, much like their state counterparts, 
according to their own interests. He combines the realities of globalization with the vast 
networks and organizations that use traditional Islam to unite the less fortunate and/or the 
disenfranchised, and pursue their own political ends.  
Mandaville’s next section poses the question, “Who Speaks for Islam?” Here, he refers to 
the struggle between “Islamism” and “post-Islamism” to explain the turbulence regarding 
possible reconciliation between traditional and modern interpretations of the religion.23  
“Islamism” takes a more literal approach to application of Holy Scripture in the Quran to life, as 
well as to legal and political institutions. Contrarily, he quotes Bayat in a description of “post-
Islamism” and/or “modern Islamist”, which “emphasizes rights instead of duties, plurality in 
place of authoritative voice, historically rather than fixed in scripture…acknowledging 
ambiguity, multiplicity, inclusion, and comprise in principles and in practice.”24   In his 
description, Bayat emphasizes that these individuals seek freedom of expression and the 
representation of different political philosophies and ideologies in government. The text goes on 
to propose that it is possible for Muslims to simultaneously partake in aspects of both “Islamism” 
and “post-Islamism.” Muslim moderates are not trying to depart from Muslim politics, but rather 
reconstitute it “in forms more suited to a globalized world.”25 
In his conclusion, Mandaville suggests that the world is changing and that Muslim 
politics are adapting to forces neoliberalism, capitalism, and globalization.26 He asserts that this 
transformation is not necessarily a pursuit of secular democracy, but a unique form of pluralized 
Muslim politics. That scholars should not see this “post-Islamism” as movement away from 
religion towards secularism, but as an attempt to eradicate notions that the separation of religion 
and politics is a pre-requisite to pluralism. Mandaville recognizes this hybrid will be difficult to 
                                                             
22 Mandaville. Global Political Islam, p. 238 
23 Ibid, p. 32-38 
24 Ibid, p. 336 
25 Ibid, p. 348 
26 Ibid, p. 332-351 
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achieve, as moderate “post Islamist” will have to contend with both traditional Islamists and 
secular undercurrents promoted by the west.27  
Mandaville argues that globalization and modern media have led to a broad moderate 
“post Islamism” movement throughout the Muslim world, and identifies the persistent presence 
of “traditionalist” and secular ideologies that compete for influence. However, his lack of state 
level analysis suggests that he may be overestimating the extent of the “post Islamist” 
transformation, as coping with globalization and the resolution of religious divisions are only 
two of the many factors that impact the formation of representative government. Mandaville does 
briefly discuss specific historical accounts of tactics regimes use to quell competition and 
opposition to their authority, but he only does so to describe the development of grievances and 
origin of organizations or popular movements. Clearly, he underestimate the role of regimes in 
maintaining the region’s current political landscape.  
After examining state interests and geopolitical realities, questions arise about 
Mandaville’s assertions regarding the degree to which Muslim populations are aware that they 
are trying to form a unique style of governance that incorporates religion and pluralism. Perhaps, 
most don’t identify this “post-Islamist” alternative because it only represents a more moderate 
form of Islam, not an additional form of government. Populations simply see government as 
corrupt, and believe pious Islamic leadership or secular military rule are the only alternatives to 
this status quo. Populations only identify with these options because the region still lacks an 
example of a state that successfully navigated the transformation to an Islamic form of 
representative government.  
Turkey and Iran have governments that are perhaps the closest to resembling this; 
however, there is no shortage of corruption allegations, censoring of media, police brutality, and 
opposition movements in either state. The structure of Iran’s government reveals many branches 
of government similar to those found in the west, but the system is subject to the religious 
oversight of the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah) and the Guardian Council (Mullahs), who most 
scholars agree, dictate Iranian policy.28 Turkey is considered a secular representative government 
that happened to elect Islamic leadership; however, it is not a representative government based 
                                                             
27 Mandaville. Global Political Islam, p. 350-351 
28 Ibid, p. 179-195 
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on Islamic principles and foundations.29 Most recently, efforts by the Islamic leadership to 
amend current laws and pass religious legislation led to secular opposition in the country. These 
protests and grievances are only exacerbated by evidence of corruption and attempts to 
consolidate more permanent political power.30 
Global Political Islam does recognize the problem of consistent instability in the region, 
but Mandaville argues that religious divisions within the populations are the primary reason 
preventing a transition to pluralistic government. What he does not adequately address is 
state/regime interests in opposing pluralism. With superior resources and organization, states 
have an ability to create a political and social environment that is not conducive to the survival of 
political transformations that could undermine their influence over government. Controlling 
access to the media, bribery, intimidation, detainment, and/or violent persecution are only a few 
possible tactics employed by the regime to consolidate political power and neutralize the 
emergence of potential rivals.  
Mandaville does a great job examining the religious identities in the Middle East, and his 
insight will be invaluable when analyzing the effects of these specific identities on Middle 
Eastern politics. He even describes Sadat’s dualist approach to domestic and foreign policy as he 
distanced himself from the Pan-Arab identity of Nasser, trying to make domestic appeals to 
religious identity parallel to foreign policy overtures towards Israel and the United States.31 
However, he does not adequately address how the state interests influence the region’s political 
landscape. The work almost assumes that the spread of modern ideas give populations the 
necessary resources to control their own destiny, if only they can reconcile the differences 
between their identities. Of course, the Arab Spring, Syria, and Iraq are just the most recent 
examples of how dynamics associated with suprastate identities can destabilize governments. 
However, an ability to destabilize government does not translate to an ability or intent to 
establish democracy. In Egypt, the military regime revealed the internal mechanisms and 
external resources that helped insulate it from the effects of instability. Mandaville’s assertions 
are useful to understand the extent to which suprastate identities influence populations in the 
                                                             
29 Mandaville. Global Political Islam, p. 120, 121 
30 The Economist. “No Longer a Shining Example: Turkey’s Government Disappoints because of Allegations of  
Sleaze and its Increasingly Authoritarian Rule”. Turkish Politics, Jan. 2014. 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21592671-turkeys-government-disappoints-because-
allegations-sleaze-and-its-increasingly-authoritarian?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4f0f060a07 
31 Mandaville. Global Political Islam, p. 107-108 
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region and provide insight into the challenges they pose to regime survival; however, he does not 
address the realist approach that regimes will take to pursue interests and maintain political 
dominance. However, this work will examine Egypt’s geopolitical situation in relation to these 
identities and inter-state relations in an attempt to clarify recent events in Egypt to explain why 
representative government will not develop from the recent revolutions. 
The first chapter will use the framework and the themes to discuss the historical context of 
the Middle East from its empirical roots and into the post WWII era. Here, the work will 
introduce the various political, cultural, and religious, “identities” adhered to by many among 
Arab populations. These identities are the foundation of the suprastate identity and irredentism, 
leading to state policies influenced by the dual demands of both the population and the state. The 
chapter will focus on Egypt’s interests and behavior in regards to these themes, but include 
additional examples to show how they shaped the current regional landscape and political 
dynamics. The objective is to show the reader the significance and salience of regional identities. 
Empire caused ethnic, religious, and cultural identities to embed themselves into local 
communities, making them susceptible to manipulation by external powers during the demise of 
the Ottoman Empire and up through WWII.  
The second chapter will analyze the introduction of the state system and the advent of oil 
following WWI and WWII. While external oil interests led to a large influx of external 
influences during WWII, their departure forced regimes to seek legitimacy by balancing state 
interests with various domestic pressures associated with identity. The segment will focus on the 
transition to autonomy, and the drastic shift in state behavior due to sudden preoccupations with 
security and legitimacy. This chapter’s objective is to show the shift in regional 
economic/security dynamics with the sudden significance of oil and an abrupt departure of 
external influences. In doing so, the work will provide a necessary transition from a regional 
context of instability and competition, to the Egyptian military’s consolidation of political and 
economic power in Egypt following WWII.  
The third section will go into more detail regarding the structure of the Egyptian government, 
using historical evidence to reveal the military’s desire to control the decision-making process 
while avoiding political accountability. In this way, the military indirectly influences and 
regulates various social, economic, and political aspects of the state, allowing them to maintain 
an image of neutrality among the Egyptian populous. The chapter will show how, over time, the 
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institutional structure of the regime insulates the military establishment from failures in 
governance, as they resign themselves to a position of definitive influence and oversight. The 
chapter will solidify the argument by revealing how the military establishment entrenched itself 
into the infrastructure of the state. With shifts in security dynamics and challenges to its 
legitimacy, the regime was able to position itself within economic and political institutions in 
response to changing international circumstances. This will provide the reader with a better 
understanding as to why they continue to maintain influence and guide state policy despite their 
previous association with the Mubarak regime. 
The fourth chapter will look at the regime in the lead up to the revolution and the effect of 
the Arab Spring on internal politics in Egypt. This will allow the reader to draw evidence from 
previous chapters to explain Egypt’s lack of significant change in leadership or regime type. 
After Mubarak was forced to step down, the Muslim Brotherhood seized the opportunity to win 
legitimate political power through elections. However, President Morsi’s term in office did not 
last. Various political maneuvers suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood had aspirations to 
consolidate political power, eventually leading to the military’s forceful removal of the 
Brotherhood from the political arena. The chapter will analyze the series of events that evolved 
in the lead up to the first elections, the revolution, through Morsi’s reign, providing evidence that 
the military had no intention to relinquish their influence over government. By analyzing the 
political context surrounding the removal of two heads of state and the military’s persistent 
relevance, chapter two will allow the reader to utilize the information from previous chapters to 
understand why another influential political entity like the Muslim Brotherhood gained and lost 
power so quickly.  
Chapter five will continue by providing a more detailed examination of the interests of states 
like Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States, that have a significant relationship with Egypt. 
Analyzing the origin and foundations of these relationships will offer additional information 
about the importance of security for regional stability. By understanding the interests of Egypt’s 
allies, the chapter provides examples of state actions to counter internal instability in Egypt. In 
doing so, the work will reveal that Egypt’s allies are consistent in their desire to prevent the 
spread of discontent to like-minded populations in neighboring states, and avoid changes in 
leadership that might alter current relationships. In this chapter, current examples will establish 
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consistencies between the framework and state behavior in the region, lending credibility to the 
argument by suggesting that states with interests in Egypt prefer stability over democracy.  
In chapter 6, the segment will focus on the geopolitical factors that allow the regime to 
contain protests, isolate discontent, neutralize political rivals, and secure external resources to 
stabilize the economy. The chapter will also highlight consistencies in the military’s behavior 
throughout its history. The chapter will then transition into an analysis of the military’s conduct 
following the Arab spring and up to the present, revealing the presence of dual/parallel external 
and internal strategies to ensure the regime’s survival. By securing external support while 
managing domestic pressures, the military was able to simultaneously discredit the Muslim 
Brotherhood, while gathering external financial resources to prevent further deterioration of the 
economy.  The execution of such an approach prevented the establishment of an alternative 
government, and allowed them maintain their influence over Egyptian politics. 
 
Conclusion 
 
When the revolution began, much of the world’s focus shifted to Takhir Square and the 
possible grassroots transition towards representative government. When Mubarak stepped down, 
this seemed to reaffirm the authenticity of revolution; however, it was actually an opportunity for 
the military to retain its position of power. Mubarak threatened the military’s control by 
proposing to give his son, Gamal, the Presidency and the business elite more political influence. 
The protests movements provided the Egyptian military an opportunity to remove two heads of 
state that sought to marginalize their role in government, all while pretending to represent the 
will of the Egyptian people. The military appears to support a limited electoral process, so long 
as politicians and bureaucrats defer to the military on policy initiatives and implementation. As a 
result, the military balanced its interests with those of the popular movement. In this way, they 
were able to navigate the political turmoil without losing their dominant political role or the 
external economic resources on which their position depends.  
 The military regime survives because they understand their capabilities and interests in 
relation to geopolitical context.  Domestically, they survive by being present in political decision 
making, but never solely accountable. This aloof approach proved to serve the military well. As 
the revolution persisted, the military remained intact and continued to govern. By carefully 
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responding to specific areas of crisis, they were able to use the chaos as an excuse to detain 
political rivals and contain the protests, all while keeping diplomatic channels open. While other 
political parties jostled for media attention and popular approval, the Egyptian military provided 
external states with a line of communication with the only significant governing body in Egypt. 
Such negotiations gave the military options, and although the U.S. promised to revoke aid if the 
military continued to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
States quickly offered their support as Egyptian military continued to marginalize the influence 
of their mutual rival.  
A consistent theme in this work is the belief that stability in the Middle East is fragile 
because of popular adherence to identities that transcend state sovereignty. The evolution of the 
Arab Spring into the current situations in Iraq and Syria, confirms the ability of popular 
movements to reverberate throughout the region. As a result, international allies are wary of 
representative government in a state like Egypt, because democracy is governance in flux. 
Fluctuating policies could disrupt existing allegiances, threaten the stability of other populations 
in the region, and have wider implications on the global economy. Since the military 
establishment in Egypt is responsible for initiating, cultivating, and maintaining many of the 
state’s international arrangements, their influence over government is also in the interests of their 
allies. 
The final portion of the conclusion will suggest that the military regime is likely to 
survive so long as identity dynamics in the region remain, and the military institution does not 
reform or fracture from within. External support for military influence over the Egyptian 
government is also likely to continue due to interests in stability and the preservation of existing 
international relationships.  
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Chapter 1 
Transition from Empire: Birth of Relevant Identities 
 
Rise of Islam 
 
When the Prophet Mohammed was born in 571 AD, the Middle East consisted of many 
different cultures and religions as the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire and the Sassanid 
Empire continued to vie for control of the region.32333435 The rise of Mohammed’s influence and 
the emergence of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula coincided perfectly with the desperate struggle 
between the Sassanid’s and the Byzantines, as much of their focus was on the strategically 
valuable cities and trade routes to the north. As the empires gained and lost territory, continuous 
war made them economically and militarily vulnerable.  
Being on the outskirts of ongoing conflict between the Sassanids and the Byzantines, 
Mohammed and his new religion grew in influence among smaller communities in the peninsula 
without drawing much attention. Initially, attempts to spread his ideas in Mecca were futile, as he 
did not yet have the reputation to attract a large number of followers. However, by moving to 
Medina, Mohammed gradually developed a loyal following, building confidence in his 
leadership through successful raids on trading caravans.36 As his reputation grew, word of his 
deeds and his religious message began to spread even further. With a battle hardened collection 
of followers, Mohammed had a force strong enough to challenge Mecca, and eventually, the 
more preeminent military powers and religious influences of the period.37   
Mohammed’s conquest was uncommon in that it did not spring from the inheritance or 
acquisition of existing political institutions and/or military resources. Instead, Mohammed 
gradually built a grassroots army through the conversion of individuals to his religious 
                                                             
32 Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History, p. 16  
33See_Ibid._ Christianity, had already spread into Europe, and was competing with Zoroastrianism as the most  
prominent religion in the Middle East. Judaism remained popular in the Levant; however, it was 
somewhat confined to a particular ethnic group. 
34 Rickard, J.A. and Hyma, Albert. An Outline of Ancient, Medieval and Modern History, p. 92 
35 Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History, p. 16_The Byzantine Empire was the result of the Roman  
Empire dividing into sections. Co-emperors governed from Rome in the western half of the empire, and  
Byzantium in the eastern half. The eastern empire survived after Rome fell around 476 AD. 
36 Mandaville. Global Political Islam, p. 27-29 
37 Ibid. 
18 
 
philosophy.38 His beliefs, combined with military victories, led to the influence necessary for 
religion to naturally conflagrate itself through the traditional means of war, trade, and commerce. 
Islam formed around Mohammed’s reputation and leadership, and those closest to him were the 
religious scholars tasked with communicating his message.39 In the wake of Mohammed’s death 
in 632 AD, dispute regarding the succession of religious authority resulted in the establishment 
of two Islamic sects, Sunni and Shia.40 This fractionalization of Islam created the two significant 
identities that are still influencing events in the present. As the influence of the religion spread 
throughout the region, Sunni and Shiite factions warred with one another over the inheritance of 
Mohammed’s religious authority, while new threats began to emerge in the west.41  
In the late 11th century AD, Christian kingdoms in Europe were uniting under Papal 
authority to gain control over their holy sites in Palestine during the decline of the Seljuk 
Empire.42 The death of prominent Seljuk rulers, combined with internal revolts by provincial 
leaders, resulted in the loss of the holy land during the First Crusade. The retreat of the Seljuks 
allowed influential family dynasties and Muslim caliphs to fill the political vacuum, eventually 
pushing the influence of the religion across North Africa and up into Spain.43 During the Middle 
Ages, the Middle East experienced both Christian invaders from the west and Mongol invaders 
from the east. For local caliphs and ruling families, political and military unity was essential. 
However, common religion facilitated the formation of alliances against foreign invaders, despite 
Islam’s sectarian divisions. The external threats faced during this period likely solidified Islam’s 
place as the preeminent religious identity in the region, as Muslim armies conscripted Indigenous 
followers and continual war temporarily suspended sectarian infighting. In 1299 AD, the Muslim 
armies of the Ottoman Turks captured the Byzantine capital, Constantinople. The powerful clan 
went on to establish an Empire that existed until their defeat in The Great War (WWI) in the 
early 20th century.4445  
                                                             
38 Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History, p. 16-17 
39 Mandaville. Global Political Islam, p. 27-29 
40 See_Mandaville. Global Political Islam p. 28,39_The Sunni sect developed from those that believed Abu Bakr was  
Mohammed’s rightful heir because the Muslim community chose him. The Shi’ite sect believed the 
leadership should remain in Mohammed’s family, favoring the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law.  
41 Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History,p. 22,23 
42 See_ Ibid, p. 25_The Seljuks were a Turko-Persian Empire that occupied the territory from Eastern Anatolia, west  
to the Hindu Kush. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See_ Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History, p. 27-34_The Muslim “gunpowder empires” emerged  
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Due to its violent history, the territorial boundaries of the region were continually 
changing due to conflict. In such a vast and diverse landscape, empires often appointed 
governors from influential tribes and/or families within the various territories of concern. 
Without the state structure observed today, boundaries between ethnicities and cultures were 
usually geographic, and for the sake of stability, empires preferred the establishment of local 
fiefdoms by minority communities rather than attempt to force their own political and religious 
norms. Any religious or political change that did occur was gradual, the result of an exposure to 
new ideas due to war, trade, and commerce. Today, unique tribal, religious, and ethnic 
affiliations within communities still persist, influencing political perspectives and loyalties 
within the population of each state. Even though Muslims are a large majority in the region, the 
ethnic identities are perhaps the most ingrained given that they predate the advent of Islam.46  
 
Post Ottoman Middle East 
  
The birth of the state system began in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries. A 
religious struggle between Protestants and Catholics resulted in the Thirty Years Wars. The 
Peace of Westphalia that followed established fixed territorial boundaries, transforming the 
ethnic and religiously bound feudal lands of the Holy Roman Empire into a system of states. As 
newly sovereign states in Europe balanced one another and sought to gain advantage over their 
rivals, the fierce competition for interests eventually spread throughout the Mediterranean.  
Despite the religious and territorial uncertainty of 16th century Europe, the Ottoman 
Empire experiencing a period of wealth and expansion.47 As competition between European 
states increased, they sought stability and strength by accumulating Ottoman gold. The European 
accomplished this by exporting a variety of goods to the Ottoman Empire. For the Ottomans, the 
imperial government could increase its security and economic interests by improving diplomatic 
relations with Europe, while also flooding markets with taxable commodities from Europe. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
out of the Middle Ages, named for the technology that aided their rise to preeminence. The Mughal 
Empire (1526–1857) ruled over the Indian sub-continent. The Safavid Empire (1501-1736) extended from 
modern day Iran, covering most of Iraq, and north into the caucuses. 
45 See_Ibid. At its height, the Ottoman Empire governed most of modern Greece, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, the Levant,  
and across North Africa. 
46 Mandaville. Global Political Islam, p. 16 
47 See_Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History, p. 48-51._ In the 16th century, the Ottomans spread  
into the Balkans and Eastern Europe, and captured port cities on the coasts of Spain and Italy. 
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Ottoman’s strategy was to offer European states trade capitulations, allowing merchants special 
legal, commercial, and even religious rights. As a result, Europeans merchants established 
communities throughout the Ottoman Empire, providing a foundation for what would evolve into 
European colonialism.48   
The economic prosperity of the Ottomans waned by the end of the 18th century. The 
discovery of the new world across the Atlantic allowed European states to acquire alternative 
resources, decreasing the demand for trade with the empire.49 Furthermore, several significant 
military defeats in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe led to a significant loss of territory. 
The result of the economic and military setbacks weakened the legitimacy of the imperial 
government, causing provincial governors to contemplate secession from the Empire. Sensing 
the retreat of Ottoman power, European states started to encroach on provinces along the 
Empire’s periphery.   
By the late 18th century, France began to turn its attention to the Ottoman province in 
North Africa. In the midst of revolution and following significant losses of their colonial territory 
in the new world, the French needed to secure resources to meet the demands of its growing 
population.50 After a successful invasion, the French tried to negotiate a deal with the Ottoman 
Empire. However, the economic consequences of the French invasion caused a sharp rise in 
coffee and gain prices within the Empire, threatening to cause further instability. As a result, the 
Ottomans sent Albanian general Mehmet Ali to retake Egypt with the help of British forces in 
1801.5152 Expelling the French put Egypt back under Ottoman hegemony; however, Mehmet Ali 
had to put down the remnants of a former Egyptian dynasty before he could secure governorship 
over the province.53  
Under Ali’s rule, Egyptian economic and military strength expanded rapidly. However; 
the newfound autonomy of the province undermined the legitimacy of Ottoman Empire, and 
threatened the interests of Europe’s colonial powers. In 1838, an alliance of British and Ottoman 
                                                             
48 Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History, p. 48-51 
49 Ibid, p. 54 
50 See_Ibid. Over-crowding in French cities, combined with an inadequate food supply was an important factor that  
contributed to the French Revolution in 1789. That same year, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt under  
orders from the French Revolutionary Directorate.  
51 Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History, p. 54, 55 
52 Farah, Nadia R. Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development, (The American University in Cairo,  
Cairo, 2009) p. 61_ Mehmet Ali, also known as “Muhammad Ali” 
53 Ibid, p. 25, 26, 62, 63_The Malmuks were a land-owning elite in Egypt during the Ottoman Empire. 
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forces defeated Mehmet Ali, and forced him to accept the terms of an Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention.54 The agreement opened the Egyptian economy to the global market, allowing 
Europeans to dump finished goods into Egypt, while protecting their own markets from Egyptian 
imports. As the economic conditions in Egypt deteriorated, a nationalist revolt sought to rid 
Egypt of external influences. However, the British intervened, putting down the insurrection in 
1882to protect their political allies. The result was land-owning elites consolidating economic 
and political power, as Britain engineered Egypt’s agricultural sector exclusively for the export 
of cotton. British control over Egyptian political and economic institutions prevented local 
intervention or involvement, leading to stratification within the social classes. The Ottoman 
leader and British ally, Khedive Isma’il, invested heavily in agricultural and infrastructure prior 
to World War I, but falling demand for Egyptian cotton forced him to take out loans from the 
British to finish uncompleted projects.55 When the economy did not recover, Khedive Isma’il 
had to sell shares of the Suez Canal to pay the British back.56 Because colonial Britain already 
established political and economic ties in Egypt, the declaration of Egypt’s independence in 1922 
did little to change the political and economic conditions for the local population.57 The 
Muhammad Ali dynasty still ruled Egypt as a monarchy, and the structure of Egypt’s political 
institutions and lack of diversity within the economy made the state vulnerable to dominance by 
ruling elites.  
During the Ottoman demise, the provinces became increasingly hard to govern given the 
different ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions within the population. The geographic barriers 
between these groups and their population centers gave local rulers an element of autonomy. 
This allowed them to pursue their own political and economic ambitions. Aware of the weakness 
of the Ottoman Empire, colonial powers sought to influence provinces on the periphery. 
However, anxiety over how the empire’s demise would affect the balance of power in Europe, 
                                                             
54 Farah, Nadia R. Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development, p.25-28 
55 Ibid, p. 25-28 
56 Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History, p. 93_The Caisse de la Dette was a European agency that  
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colonial powers tried on several occasions to preserve the imperial government’s integrity. 
However, the rise of Germany did destabilize Europe, setting the stage for the Great War. 58  
 
Post WWI, the League of Nations, and the Birth of States in the Middle East 
 
The defeat of Germany and its Ottoman allies during WWI, led to the emergence of the 
United States as a significant international player. Due to lingering competition among states on 
the European continent, the U.S. proposed the League of Nations to facilitate dialogue between 
the powers in the aftermath of the war.59 However, it was not a diplomatic success. Many 
disagreements over the fate of Europe and the Ottoman Empire threatened the post war peace. 
Despite Assyrians, Armenians, Kurds, Arabs, and Jews, all making demands for sovereignty and 
self-determination, the League of Nations proceeded with the territorial partition of the Middle 
East.60 Unlike the birth of the states in Europe, which divided territory around feudal systems 
with ethnic, cultural, and religious continuity, the European states divided the spoils of the 
Ottoman Empire according to their own interests.61  
Since the United States was not a colonial power, it opposed the allocation of 
economically desirable territory to Russia and European states. Instead, the U.S. hoped to gain 
international influence and political capital by encouraging self-determination.62 If deployed 
effectively, the self-determination message would appeal to local populations in the United 
States and Europe, as well as in the Middle East. In doing so, colonial powers might have more 
difficultly expanding their influence over the economically desirable territories.63 To counter this 
U.S. policy, Britain, France, and Russia attempted to support the self-determination narrative, 
while secretly making plans to divide specific areas amongst themselves.64 To satisfy the self-
determination demands of the United States, the League of Nations left the Arabian Peninsula 
under the control of the Saudi dynasty. Perhaps colonial powers did not view the territory as 
                                                             
58 Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History, p. 59._ Message from British Government to the Russians  
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59 Gelvin, James L. The Modern Middle East: A History, p. 180  
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, p. 47,48 
62 Ibid, p. 180-183 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
23 
 
desirable due to the lack of resources and complicated religious/tribal dynamics surrounding 
Islam’s holy sites. Furthermore, the location was far from the Mediterranean, and with the Suez 
Canal facilitating trade from the Far East, post war Europe did not appear to exhibit much 
enthusiasm about investing in the arid interior.65  
Russia’s interests in the Ottoman Empire lay in acquiring access to warm water port in 
Turkey, and control over the Turkish Straits. The straits were significant to Russian interests due 
to the fact that during that time, 40 percent of Russian exports passed through the Bosporus. 
Russia also wanted to gain influence over the Baltic region, giving Russia security on its 
southern border close to Europe, and additional access to the Mediterranean.66   
The French, on the other hand, had historic claims to territories that make up present-day 
Syria and Lebanon, as many Maronite Christians of French origin made up a minority of that 
population. The League of Nations mandate gave them political influence those territories. 
Convenient, as many the economic benefits of the territory included previous French investments 
in their rail lines and silk production during the Ottoman period. 67 
Concerning Britain, their primary interests in the post WWI Middle East was securing 
trade routes to protect their valuable trade interests with India. However, Britain also had 
invested heavily in Egypt’s agricultural during the Ottoman era, particularly to influence the 
trade of Egyptian cotton. 68 Britain saw the Middle East’s fledgling governments as a means to 
spread its influence and secure access to potentially profitable areas that could be attractive for 
future investments. While oil’s international value was not yet fully realized, Britain did 
understand its potential military benefits. This, combined with their lack of domestic sources of 
petroleum, drove their initiative to invest political and economic capital in the region following 
WWI. As a result, British advisers retained colonial style influence over governments in Jordan, 
Iraq, and much of what is now Israel and the Palestinian territories.69  
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The history of the region is significant because it reveals the various cultural, political, 
and religious influences on populations that cultivated the suprastate identities that remain 
relevant, despite the recent structural transformations in the international system. While Islam 
did act as a unifying force to expel foreign invaders during the crusades, the religious continuity 
did not help the Ottomans during the decline of their empire. Competition in Europe caused 
those states to aggressively pursue interests in the new world and on the Ottoman periphery. As 
they grew in strength, the weakening economy of the empire caused provincial governors to 
begin to act with more autonomy. For fear of what the demise of the empire would mean for 
Europe, colonial powers had to intervene to stabilize the imperial government. When the balance 
of power did shift in Europe, WWI sealed the empire’s fate, leaving the League of Nations to 
decide how to divide territory. With the formation of state boundaries, communities no longer 
enjoyed the semi-autonomous existence they had under the empires. Instead, the reorganization 
of the region forced them to confront new “state centric” identities and interests, resulting in 
many of the modern domestic challenges within Middle Eastern states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
The State System 
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Following the League of Nation mandates and the establishment of state borders in the 
former Ottoman Empire, the Middle East was still reeling from the political and economic 
consequences of the war. The war caused severe famine, political turmoil, and economic 
devastation. Without Ottoman hegemony, there was no longer a political framework uniting the 
different ethnic populations that once coexisted under the empire. “As a result, varieties of 
nationalism- Turkish nationalism, Arab nationalism, Egyptian nationalism, Syrian nationalism, 
and so on- spread throughout the region.”70 However, the mandates prevented these movements 
from becoming a threat, as locals did not have the economic or military resources necessary to 
mobilize the population and force political change. State-building efforts were undertaken by the 
foreign powers, and local economies were bound to European governments. The situation 
created an unfavorable economic climate that stifled growth and discouraged any private 
investments. With advances in technology in Europe and the United States, private companies 
were taking advantage of the discovery of oil in the region; however, their investments provided 
minimal returns to local communities. During WWII, the British fortified Egypt to protect their 
economic interests along the Nile, on the Mediterranean, and in Iraq. However, the grip of 
colonialism started to slip as the war raged on in Europe. As a result, ethnic, religious, and 
nationalist movements began forming within the populations, creating a combustible political 
environment for local governments on the verge of autonomy.  
 
The Advent of Mechanized Warfare and the Geopolitics of Oil 
 
Today, oil is one of the most valuable commodities in the world. However, the oil 
industry in the early 20th century was only becoming relevant in Europe, Russia, and the United 
States. With WWI and the industrial revolution spurring development within these states, 
advancements in technology led to a realization of the commercial and military benefits 
associated with petroleum based energy. Since locating, extracting, and refining the resource was 
a complicated and expensive process, local oil reserves within U.S. states were enough to sustain 
the industry’s gradual growth.71 For Britain; however, the colonial tendencies associated with 
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power projection and influence depended on an ability to modernize their military. The invention 
of internal four-stroke combustible engines changed everything. Liquid fuel made steam engines 
obsolete, creating the opportunity for innovation in the production of small vehicles, ships, and 
aircraft.72 
 As the industry expanded, U.S. businessmen, geologists, and investors were drawn to oil 
by demands associated with new technology.  Due to the small size of the British Isles and its 
limited domestic resources, British power and influence depended heavily on naval reach. As a 
result, the British were particularly interested in understanding the capabilities of oil as a military 
necessity. The early trails and errors with the production and refinement of oil in the United 
States led to advancements in capabilities. As U.S. oil companies’ expanded, foreign 
governments sought their expertise for locating, extracting, and refining the resource.73  
By the time WWII started, technological advances enabled highly mechanized military 
forces on land, air, and sea. The demand for these vehicles was such that it had a dramatic effect 
on International Relations in relation to oil. In response to this evolution in technology, the 
United States and the czarist government in Russia prioritized the location and production of oil 
within their large sovereign territories.74 Spurred by the demands of both the private and the 
public sector, U.S. oil firms helped spur the advancement of the industry, and eventually 
exported their services and expertise to Russia and the Middle East. Without the same territorial 
luxuries, Britain used their old colonial ties to advance the discovery and production outside their 
sovereign boundaries in an attempt to secure access to the resource.75   
   Oil was so essential during WWII that much of the Axis and Allied strategy in the war 
evolved around securing the resource, or cutting off the enemy’s supply. While Germany’s quick 
military build-up and technological advancements before WWII was impressive, they lacked an 
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mechanized weapon platform could traverse harsh terrain and the barbed wire fortifications that 
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adequate domestic oil supply. By allying itself with Italy and quickly initiating a campaign in 
North Africa, the Nazis attempted to seize control of newly discovered sources of oil to secure a 
supply line of the resource to their forces to Europe.76 When that campaign failed, Germany had 
little choice but to advance into the Soviet Union to secure their reserves. After being pushed out 
of Africa and unable to subdue the Soviet Union, the Nazis simply did not have the fuel to 
sustain campaigns on multiple fronts. In short, WWII revealed that a state’s military capabilities 
were dependent upon its ability to secure reliable sources and supply lines for oil. 77  
 
Post World War II 
 
Following World War II, Middle Eastern states geographically located on the perimeter 
of the region, like Turkey, Israel, and Iran, advanced more rapidly due to their strategic 
economic and military value. With proximity to Europe and the Soviet Union, external states had 
interests in their stability and development. 78  However, the rest of the region had yet to adjust to 
the transition away from empire and the economic exploitation associated with colonialism. 
When began, Germany immediately took interest in the Middle East due to the discovery of oil, 
as much of their access to the resource depended upon their ability to procure it outside of their 
own sovereign territory. In the initial stages of the conflict, Britain sought to protect its interest in 
the Middle East by investing in local infrastructure to aid in the movement of military equipment 
and facilities in the region.79 After the allies pushed the Germans out of North Africa, the focus 
of the war shifted back to Europe. As a result, former benefactors became less concerned about 
the political and economic development of Middle Eastern states.80. With few political avenues 
of recourse, unaddressed grievances continued to divide regional populations along ethnic and 
religious lines. In contrast, those same populations were lax in accepting the legitimacy of local 
ruling elites.81  
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The destruction in Europe during WWII caused many of the post-war powers to retreat 
and focus most of their resources on their own reconstruction. The retreat of European influence 
led to declarations of independence in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, as well as the formation 
of the Jewish state of Israel. While the U.S. and European allies endorsed the establishment of 
Israel, the post-war powers were not interested in intervening militarily on its behalf. Israel’s 
sudden existence displaced Palestinian communities, angering Arab populations throughout the 
region. Without fear of U.S. or European military reprisal, fledgling Middle Easter regimes saw 
an opportunity to take advantage of nationalist sentiments and expand their legitimacy.  
With holy sites from a number of different religions present in the Levant, many religious 
and ethnic identities made, and continue to make, historical claims over the territory 
(irrendentism). The creation of a Jewish state in 1948 is significant because it granted 
sovereignty to a single identity. Arab Irredentism made opposing the creation of a Jewish state 
not only politically popular for a regime, but a means of securing additional legitimacy.82 In a 
sudden display of unity, populations did rally behind their governments in opposition to Israel. 
However, the loss of the Arab-Israeli war and the loss of Palestine only increased public 
discontent, destabilizing the regimes that took part in the invasion.83  
  While the survival of Israel likely contributed to the overthrow of the Egyptian 
Monarchy, it taught new regimes the value of highlighting external threats to deflect internal 
opposition. With the presence of Israel, duality became a cornerstone for future Arab foreign 
policies. Deflecting internal hostilities with anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist rhetoric also fed into 
nationalist sentiments, giving regimes temporary flexibility to pursue regional interests by 
exporting blame and unifying the center.84  
 
Arab Autonomy within the State System 
 
Without adequate legitimacy, ruling family dynasties and/or oligarchies had to act 
quickly to validate their right to rule. However, by 1958, military coups disposed of regimes in 
Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The economic consequences of colonialism left every regime in the 
region vulnerable, as grievances among the population remained unaddressed. As a result, the 
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burden fell on regimes to attempt to quickly establish an institutional political hierarchy to 
govern and execute policy.85 The additional military capabilities and diminished presence of 
European influences led to an increase in regional competition and autonomy, as regimes sought 
to unify their populations and legitimize their rule by aggressively advancing their interests.    
From 1945 to 1955, King Abdullah of Jordan instigated instability in the region when he 
began promoting his ambitions for a “Greater Syria”. Before and immediately after the 1948 
Arab invasion of Israel, King Abdullah discreetly negotiated with Israel to secure treaty that 
would guarantee peace and allow Jordan to absorb much of the Palestinian territory in the West 
Bank.86 Britain and other western benefactors encouraged the geopolitical maneuver, but Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, and Syria, recognized Jordan’s motivations. To counter Jordan, the other states 
began cooperating to effectively balance warming relations between Jordan and Israel. Jordan’s 
negotiations with Israel initiated autonomous state behavior within the new state system. During 
the Cold War, regional coalitions became common as states balanced one another and pursued 
interests.87  
Currently, the region continues to witness coalitions and counter coalitions. These 
conditional alliances often form and dissipate as states attempt to prevent the rise of a regional 
hegemon.88 While these interactions remain characteristic of a multi-polar state system, they also 
communicate a mutual acknowledgement of one another’s legitimacy. This was significant 
during the Cold War because it indicated a shift in regional relations. Without a reliance on 
external benefactors, states undertook more complex policy initiatives to advance interests 
beyond their own sovereign territory. 89  
During the Cold War, much of the world was choosing sides between East (communism) 
and West (capitalism). Instead of choosing this more aggregate policy approach, Middle Eastern 
regimes took advantage of these international conditions while focusing on regional affairs. They 
accumulated influence and legitimacy by using the superpowers at their convenience. As states 
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balanced on another, they also used nationalist and/or anti-imperial rhetoric to divert local 
discontent. 90The multi-polar state activity and continual state maneuvering during this period 
also facilitated the relevance of ethnic and state-centric identities. 
 
Egypt was still under British influence during WWII. Due to the importance of oil and 
the German campaign in North Africa, the British military fortified Egypt to protect its interest in 
the region. With military hardware and British training, the Egyptian military became a powerful 
institution. The post-WWII situation in the Middle East was unique because of the sudden 
departure of European influence. Unlike the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the end of 
WWII saw newly independent regimes having to seek legitimacy and security in a state system 
with limited external influence.  
Even as U.S. and Soviet interests led to greater external influence the region, their 
approach was very different than the Europeans during the colonial period. Perhaps due to the 
global scale of the rivalry and/or the concern of provoking a military response, the superpowers 
refrained from occupying states to force regime change. Instead, they attempted to secure 
beneficial relationships in the region using military and economic aid. In this way, the 
superpowers could guarantee the security of an ally, while maintaining a defensive posture.91 
The military regime in Egypt took advantage of this approach, obtaining significant economic 
and military aid from the U.S and the Soviets. The rivalry had significant influence on the 
current military regime in Egypt, as the political and economic infrastructure of the state evolved 
around their ability to remain an important factor in the interests of external states.92  
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Chapter 3 
The Establishment of the Civil-Military Regime 
 
The previous chapters described the emergence of identities, the evolution of the region 
into a system of states, and how internal instability and the absence of external influences 
following WWII led to greater autonomy. The following chapter looks at the formation and 
structure of the Egyptian military regime to better understand the current stability of the military 
establishment and the challenges facing political liberalization. 
Over the course of Egypt’s recent history, the pursuit of interests led to the evolution of a 
very unique political landscape and institutional infrastructure heavily influenced by the military. 
While Egypt’s interests remain relatively consistent, the transition away from the Ottoman 
Empire following World War I, the colonial influences of European states prior to WWII, and 
the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, led to many fluctuations in international and regional 
dynamics. The current Egyptian state is a result of the regime attempting to secure its interests 
while navigating the changing conditions.93 After overthrowing a relic Ottoman monarchy 
following WWII, a group of military officers became the ruling elite. Steve Cook in Ruling not 
Governing, talks about how the military reformed the political system and governing body, while 
also transforming the economic infrastructure of Egypt through the nationalization of various 
industries, institutions, and resources.94 For the purpose of stability, interests, and survival, the 
nature of the military regime changed over time, requiring military leaders to resign from 
military service to take specific positions within government and economic institutions.95 Those 
that heavily influence the policy and decision making process of the state are an older generation 
of high ranking military officers and former military known as the old guard.96 They hold 
prominent positions in the military, government, on boards, and in various institutions or 
councils, often overseeing the implementation of policy within their respective roles.97  
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In accordance with interests and necessity, the Egyptian regime continued to change. The 
regime attempted to shed the responsibilities of daily governance, while maintaining a monopoly 
on policy and decision-making. Due to careful legal manipulation, the regime carefully instituted 
reforms to privatize the economy and democratize government. The nationalized industries 
became private holding companies owned and managed by individuals loyal to the military. 
Similarly, the regime put different political institutions under the supervision of military 
affiliates, or provided legal authority to parallel military institutions. Steven Cook’s work refers 
to these political and economic entities as military fiefdoms.98 The fiefdoms allowed the military 
oversight over essential political and economic sectors of the state. As the bureaucracy 
developed, the regime also populated it with former military officials or military affiliates. The 
military establishment describes the collection of all these military related entities across the 
security, economic and political infrastructure of the state.99  
 The foundation of the present political system in Egypt is the result of a military coup 
orchestrated by a group of mid-ranking officers on July 23, 1952.100 In order to maintain control 
over the government, the Free Officers, led by Gamal Nasser and Muhammad Naguib, had to 
quickly develop a strategy to gain legitimacy and marginalize potential opponents. Within 
months, they abolished the constitution, dissolved the existing parliament, outlawed political 
parties, exiled King Fauk, and declared a three-year period of transitional military rule under the 
newly formed Revolutionary Command Council.101 As native Egyptians from the middle and 
lower classes, the Free Officers relied upon their left-wing ideology and Arab-Nationalist 
identities to garner temporary domestic support and legitimacy. The RCC reinforced this by 
implementing an agrarian reform that limited the amount of land an individual could own to 80 
hectares (then down to 20 hectares in 1969), confiscating the additional land from the 
landowning elites to redistribute to those among the lower classes. The RCC also nationalized a 
variety of industries, putting military officers in charge of a growing public sector while seizing 
the economic pillars that sustained the former elites.102 Nasser oversaw the implementation of 
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these domestic policies, allowing him and his allies to consolidate control over the Egyptian 
economy and fortify influence over the country’s only post-Nasser political party, the Liberation 
Rally.103 However, disagreements over these policies and the future of Egypt eventually led to 
the RCC’s discrediting of many key military members. In 1955, Nasser’s influence over the RCC 
got him appointed President until the RCC finished the constitution, and the National Union 
party replaced the Liberation Rally as the state’s only political party.104 During a national 
referendum in 1956, the RCC announced the new constitution and Gamal Nasser won the 
Presidential election. These events led to the dissolution of the RCC, and coincided with the end 
of the three-year transitional period since the formal end of the monarchy.105  
 With dissolution of the RCC, the military officers that supported Nasser resigned from 
their military posts to take positions at the top of the recently nationalized industries. Nasser’s 
first initiative was to nationalize the Suez Canal Company, instigating the 1956 war. That 
conflict pitted Nasser against Israel and the former colonial powers of France and Britain. 
Having already removed the former Egyptian elite, Nasser’s decision to challenge the interests of 
former colonial powers made Nasser a national hero and a champion of Arab-nationalism.106 
With this rise in regional prestige, Nasser attempted to merge Syria and Yemen into a United 
Arab Republic (UAR); however, only Syria agreed to the terms. With his influence over 
Damascus, Nasser attempted to extend his influence into Iraq by engineering a coup to 
overthrow its leader, Abdel-Kareem Qasim. With Egypt dominating the governance and foreign 
policy of the UAR, members of the local Syrian army began to resent their client-state position 
under Nasser. In 1961, they expelled the Egyptians and declared their independence.107  
 For the Egyptian military establishment, a successful resolution to the Suez Crisis led to 
an increase in regional legitimacy, and secured additional economic and security benefits for the 
state. However, the failure of the UAR had the opposite effect. Rifts began to form within the 
military’s ranks, as many within the institution and among the population questioned Nasser’s 
leadership. As a result, Nasser purged the military those who opposed him by dissolving the 
National Union. Nasser replaced the National Union with the Arab Socialist Union, populating it 
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with military officers loyal to him while tightening the military’s grip on government.108 The 
new platform of this party sought to boost domestic support for Nasser, and it did so by 
nationalizing more private industries and expanding social benefits.109 The newly nationalized 
industries went to Nasser’s political/military allies, enhancing the Egyptian military’s influence 
over the state’s economy.110 The drastic reforms required a new constitution, so Nasser formed a 
250 member preparatory committee that would draft the constitution and lay the foundation for 
the establishment of a National Congress of Popular Forces. The intent of the congress was to 
give the impression of the inclusiveness by allocating seats to different segments of the working-
class of society. However, the regime set aside 50 percent of the seats to workers within a public 
sector already heavily influenced by the regime.111 
 While trying to manage domestic affairs, Egypt also had to respond to two significant 
regional events. The successful coup in Iraq brought a pro-Egyptian government to power. As a 
result, Nasser reignited talks of another Pan-Arab government in an attempt to further Egyptian 
influence over the region.112 The unity government did not materialize; however, because the 
new Iraqi government refused to accept Nasser’s terms. In Yemen, a pro-Egyptian government 
was under attack from supporters of an exiled religious leader, Imam, backed by Saudi Arabia.113 
 Saudi Arabia supported popular Islamist groups in Egypt that consistently made attempts 
to undermine Nasser’s political legitimacy, and other nationalist movements/governments in the 
region. To counter the threat of Islamic influences in Egypt, Nasser initiated crackdowns of the 
Saudi sponsored groups in Egypt. One such group was the Muslim Brotherhood, and Nasser’s 
contempt for the organization was a result of their popularity among the Egyptian population 
which challenged his own nationalist agendas in the region. Being an Egyptian ally, the Yemen 
Arab Republic (YAR) appealed to Nasser for assistance, and as civil conflict ensued, Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia became locked in a taxing proxy war in the 1960s.114  
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 By failing to unite Egypt and Iraq, and stuck in an unfavorable situation in Yemen, 
Nasser began to face opposition from some his closest military supporters who had been with 
him since the Free Officers Movement.115Furthermore, the bureaucracy The National Congress 
created competing political and economic factions within the heavily regulated system, resulting 
in corruption and administrative inefficiencies. The combination of government mismanagement 
and the squandering of resources in Yemen caused the economic situation to quickly deteriorate. 
The Egyptian defeat at the hands of Israel in the 1967 war was yet another significant blow to the 
credibility of the military establishment. Public outrage and large anti-government 
demonstrations prompted Nasser to have to reshuffle the political/military leadership and rethink 
the military’s role in governance.116  
After the ’67 war, Nasser relieved a number of generals of their command, and 
introduced a reform known as the March 30 program.117 The program was an effort by Nasser to 
distance the military from the responsibilities directly associated with governance. Perhaps, 
Nasser believed that the combined military and political responsibilities diminished the 
military’s professionalism, threatening the security interests of the state. From this initiative, 
Nasser enacted a law in 1968 specifically designed to separate the military from formal 
government posts.  However, because the Israelis still occupied the Sinai, Nasser wanted to 
ensure the military did not lose its influence over policy and decision making. The military 
retained its privileged positon in the state by filling the key government positions with civilians 
closely associated with the military establishment.118 In this way, the military could focus on 
matters of state security, while having significant oversight over Egypt’s governing body. When 
Nasser died of a heart attack in 1970, Vice President Anwar Sadat assumed the role of 
President.119 
 
 
 
 
Sadat and the Military Elite 
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 When Sadat assumed leadership, his first order of business was to solidify his leadership 
through the “Corrective Revolution”, designed to purge the government and military of Nasser 
loyalist, replacing them by promoting others from within the officer corps that would be loyal to 
him.120 After reorganizing these positions, Sadat prepared a military operation in collaboration 
with Syria, and made a military deal with the Soviets to help him rebuild and resupply his 
military. The objective of Egypt and Syria was to regain lost territory from the 1967 war, 
specifically the Sinai and Golan Heights. The surprise invasion temporarily caught the Israelis 
off guard, and the Egyptian military advanced through the Sinai and over the Suez Canal facing 
only limited resistance.121 However, the Israeli counter-offensive took a toll on the Syrian 
military, and the Israelis were pressing the Egyptian lines almost to the point of breaking, 
encircling Egypt’s Third Army in the city of Suez. The Egyptians regained the Sinai, and the 
Israelis had little desire to continue the fight to try to take it back. The October War ended in a 
ceasefire with both sides declaring victory. By successfully retaking the Sinai, Sadat earned the 
loyalty of a previously divided military, and gained considerable influence domestically and 
across the region.122  
With the loyalty of the military and support of the Egyptian people, Sadat declared an 
economic “Infitah” in 1974, presenting it as a shift away from socialism.123 The new policy also 
conveniently allowed Sadat to purge Nasserist elements in the military and government, using 
economic liberalization as a method to remove and replace those elements from key positions at 
the top of Egypt’s nationalized industries. The symbolic shift away from socialism also led to the 
acquisition of a new economic and military benefactor in the United States, and more significant 
shifts in the structure of Egypt’s political, economic, and military society.  
Sadat’s overhaul of Egyptian society included the creation of a new party in 1976, The 
National Democratic Party, to replace Nasser’s ASU. By ’77, Sadat implemented Law 40, 
legalizing the formation of additional political parties.124 For the military, the combination of 
Sadat’s purge, the October War victory, and the promise of a new generation of a U.S. trained 
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officer corps elevated their morale and their loyalty to Sadat. As a result, Sadat faced no military 
opposition to signing the 1978 peace accord and recognizing the state of Israel. 125 
In 1979, Sadat also signed Law 32, intended to further liberalize Egypt’s economy. While 
the intent was to privatize the rest of the state-owned industries, the law essentially gave the 
military the freedom to engage in business enterprises, while also giving them financial and 
economic independence from the state. With military and former military in key industry 
positons, the result was the establishment of quasi-military owned holding companies working 
with foreign investors. Not only were these immune to certain tax obligations, they actually 
received subsidies from the government, allowing business associated with the military to take 
the industry lead in electronics, infrastructure, energy, agribusiness, aviation, tourism, security, 
and consumer goods.126  
During Sadat’s Presidency, The Defense Ministry begun efforts to establish two 
commercial entities that became significant economic entities within the Egyptian state: The 
National Services Projects, and the Egyptian Organization for Industrial Development. The 
organizations negotiated contracts with domestic and international manufacturing firms; thus, 
former military were able extract commissions from these joint business ventures. While Nasser 
initially removed the burden of governance from the military to make it more professional, 
Sadat’s alliance with the United States and peace with Israel caused them to shift their attention, 
not to security, but rather to economic control.  
Early in his Presidency, Sadat also embraced the Islamist identity as the allure of 
nationalism declined following the ’67 war. With ongoing negotiations between the U.S and 
Egypt after the October War, perhaps Sadat felt that he needed to prevent the rise of an 
influential opposition, or co-opt these conservative elements to counter former Nasserist allies 
and left-wing influences in Egyptian society sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Whatever his 
motives, Sadat did not pursue the Muslim Brotherhood like his predecessor, instead, he 
encouraged and embraced their activity.   
During the 1970’s, political Islamist movements were occurring all over the Middle East 
as Islamism began to  replace the nationalist, Pan-Arab, and Marxist trends of the 1950s and 60s. 
The regimes identified the Muslim Brotherhood a more moderate driver of this social movement 
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by promoting Islamic principles and establishing an institutional presence.127 Anwar Sadat 
supported this wave of Islamism and even encouraged the establishment of Islamic groups on 
university campuses. The Muslim Brotherhood contained influential religious, professional, and 
academic figures who cleverly targeted the youth and the impoverished. The Brotherhood gained 
popularity using a sophisticated public relations campaign, focusing on social welfare initiatives 
to benefit these segments of the population. With limited access to the political arena, the 
Brotherhood adapted by fulfilling as many community roles as possible.128  
Still financed by Saudi Arabia, the Brotherhood established a network of business and 
charitable organizations to fund their social initiatives. In doing so, members of The Brotherhood 
elevated themselves to prominent and influential positons in Egyptian society, as the global 
economic recession to its toll on Egypt in the late 70’s and into the 80s.129 By aligning himself 
with the Islamist identity, Sadat hoped to gain enough domestic support from this movement to 
navigate recession and limit opposition to foreign policy initiatives that would further the long 
term security and economic interests of the state.   
For the military, there was little opposition to Sadat because the privatization efforts put 
them in charge of the state’s most valuable industries. The financial exemptions given to quasi-
military industries allowed many within the military establishment to accumulate wealth without 
tax obligations to the government.130 Furthermore, aid from the United States also went directly 
to the military or through military controlled institutions, and they used these funds to enhance 
their security capabilities and safeguard their positions in political and economic sectors of 
society. The institutional links between the military, government, and the business sector, meant 
that retired military officers could conduct business and influence policy without having to fear a 
civilian business elite that could challenge their authority or create a rifts between the military 
and the executive branch.131 Furthermore, the structure of government gave the military the 
ability to dictate the political and economic direction of the state. The more inclusive political 
arena did nothing to increase civilian influence, but instead, added a buffer between the military 
and the population that greatly reduced their level of accountability. The newly established 
                                                             
127 Mandaville, Peter. Global Political Islam, p. 98, 99 
128 Ibid, p. 110, 111. 
129 Hinnebusch and Ehteshami. The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, p. 100-101 
130 STRATFOR: “The Evolving Modern Egyptian Republic: A Special Report” 
131 Ibid. 
39 
 
bureaucracy shouldered the burden of day-to-day governance but lacked the authority to 
challenge the military on policy matters.  
While Sadat had the support of the military, his initiatives to grow the public and private 
sector were not yielding results for the rest of the Egyptian population. The increased financial 
burden on the state during the recession meant that Sadat had to do away with many government 
subsidies implemented by Nasser. Such austerity measures meant that government would no 
longer guarantee employment for university graduates, and many well educated Egyptians had 
trouble finding work. Furthermore, the newfound wealth of the military establishment, combined 
with the global recession and unsuccessful austerity measures, caused substantial stratification 
between the social classes. In response to these conditions, the Muslim Brotherhood were able to 
expand their social network by opening hospitals, charities, schools, and mosques, to provide 
people with services they could no longer afford.132  
The bread riots in 1977 tested the stability of the military political/economic institutional 
conglomerate, revealing both their ability to restore order and to apply pressure on the President 
for instant changes in policy. The riots started as the result of austerity measures that Sadat 
deemed necessary for the economic stability of the state; however, they disrupted internal 
political stability, and the military had to stabilize the situation by quelling the uprising and 
forcing an end to Sadat’s measures.133 Early attempts to gain domestic favor by co-opting the 
Islamists worked temporarily; however, his efforts were later undermine by the peace with Israel. 
The Brotherhood had already capitalized on the regime’s austerity measures, furthering their 
own influence by providing services to the lower classes. As frustration with Sadat’s domestic 
and foreign policies grew, members within the Brotherhood grew displeased with the group’s 
lack of aggressive political activism, and more aggressive splinter groups within the Brotherhood 
emerged.134 
 
 
 
Mubarak and the Rise of the Business Elite  
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When the Islamist turned on Sadat and assassinated him in ’81, his successor, Hosni 
Mubarak solidified the military’s predominance over the state by declaring emergency powers 
and initiating a campaign to pacify radical elements within the state. To preserve the legitimacy 
of the regime and the political system, Mubarak did release some political prisoners, allowed the 
establishment of additional political parties, and held parliamentary elections in accordance to 
Sadat’s Law 40 implemented back in 1977. By adding more parties and civilians into the 
political system, Mubarak could aggressively pursue Islamist elements in society while trying to 
limit the possibility of a public backlash.135  
During the early 80’s, Tandheem al-Jihad and Gamaa al-Islamiyah were the primary 
Islamist targets of the regime at the time.136 The two groups were more violent anti-government 
offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, and as such, they were in competition with one another for 
religious preeminence within Egyptian society. Parallel to the implementation of emergency 
powers, Mubarak took advantage of the internal disputes of the Islamists by co-opting the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood would provide information about the activities of other 
Islamist groups, and in exchange, they could continue to spread their social activities within 
professional, religious, academic institutions, as well as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).137 
While the Muslim Brotherhood remained banned as a political party, Mubarak did allow 
Muslim Brotherhood members to be candidates in election as members of an existing political 
party. In 1984, Muslim Brotherhood members won 58 out of 454 available seats as part of a 
coalition with the Wafd party. As the 80’s progressed, the Mubarak security crackdowns against 
Tandheem al-Jihad and Gamaa al-Islamiyah did weaken their presence within society. However, 
the Muslim Brotherhood appeared to be making significant gains, attracting additional scrutiny 
from the regime. Even with the uneasy cooperation between the Brotherhood and the regime, 
many members of the organization did occasionally get harassed and detained as the military 
tried to keep their growing influence in check.138  
  Another election in the 80’s saw the Muslim Brotherhood and their political allies 
continue to gain seats in parliament, despite Mubarak’s attempts to manipulate the electoral 
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process to dilute their presence in parliament. As a result, the decade saw one dissolution of 
parliament, and several squabbles with The Supreme Constitutional Court over the 
constitutionality of the regime’s electoral reforms. By the election in 1990, rulings by the court 
lifted some restrictions by allowing participation of independent candidates. However, the 
rulings favored Mubarak, allowing the regime to maintain the political advantage by redrawing 
the electoral districts.139  
 With every attempt to gain political legitimacy, the military’s willingness to uphold the 
democratic façade allowed opposition groups to slowly gain a more significant presence in 
government institutions. Since Nasser’s Arab Socialists Movement (ASM), the military 
establishment consolidated the state’s decision-makers into a dominant political party. Doing so 
put former military in key political positions, allowing them to influence policy and oversee its 
implementation. When Sadat introduced more political parties and expanded the civilian 
bureaucracy, the old guard’s positons in high-office allowed them to maintain their monopoly on 
policy and decision-making. However, additional democratic reforms under Mubarak increased 
presence of opposition groups. While the military kept limits to their political influence, the 
increased presence of opposition in the bureaucracy often translated into public scrutiny.140 The 
Islamist presence in government not only allowed them to accuse the NDP of corruption, but 
their affiliation with the popular Islamic identity gave their voice additional credibility. In 1990, 
the Islamist opposition’s political victories completely destabilized the Algerian regime.141 Such 
events only emboldened Egypt’s Islamists, and reminded the Mubarak regime of his own 
vulnerabilities. For the first time, the Egyptian military regime felt the need for influential 
political allies within the population. Mubarak needed an influential civilian group that had a 
stake in the maintaining the status quo, but could also work to counter the influence of Islamist 
groups.142  
In Egypt, the 1990’s saw new initiatives by the Mubarak regime to promote further 
economic liberalization. The reforms that followed revealed that regime’s intent to foster the rise 
of a business elite, giving industries and private business owners generous concessions in an 
attempt to facilitate desperately needed economic growth. However, doing this resulted in many 
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political incentives to business owners that allowed them to quickly establish themselves as 
active participants in the regime.  The economic initiatives privatized many state-owned 
enterprises capable of extracting immediate revenue and attracting foreign investors. In the 
absence of competition, the reforms privatized near monopolies in the iron, steel, cement, 
telecommunication, and food & beverage industries, and their association with the regime 
created many grey areas regarding ownership.143  
After passing Law 203 in 1991, the Egyptian regime set out to privatize 314 existing 
state-owned enterprises. According to Carana Corporation, “The law stipulated that ‘holding 
companies’ (HCs) would replace the ‘Organizations’ of the public sector, and ‘affiliated 
companies (ACs) would replace those supervised by the replaced organization.”144 Due to the 
military establishment’s concern regarding the fate of their existing holding companies, 
approximately 85 companies were exempt from the first round of reforms. Of the remaining 
state-owned industries targeted in the reform, the regime allowed the government sponsored 
business elite to take partial ownership of remaining assets.145 As a result, state-owned industries 
were divided into holding companies either owned by the military establishment and/or the 
business elite. During the first few years, it appears the regime was figuring out how to work 
around IMF standards to manipulate privatization efforts and redistribute state assets. 
Consequently, the economic impact of the first few years of the privatization efforts were 
minimal.  
 As the business elite continued to acquire state-owned assets, many of the companies 
quickly started to produce revenue and attracting foreign investments. Though, like the military 
owned holding companies during the Sadat years, the average Egyptian citizen never saw any of 
the economic benefits of the privatization reforms. A 2008 article for the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace alludes to the nature of the reforms from their enactment in ’91 up to 
when the article was written. The authors suggest that the transfer of assets can only create a 
healthier economy if “well-established institutions prevent the creation of private monopolies. 
Hence, ‘share in ownership’ will give nothing to Egyptian citizens and will not achieve the 
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announced objective of a more even distribution of wealth.”146 They go on to claim that the 
regime never bothered to explain how the Egyptians would ever benefit from these reforms. The 
lack of clarity appears to be intentional, reaffirming the idea that privatization efforts were only a 
means to reassert the regime’s influence over the state through the creation of a state-sponsored 
civilian elite. By meeting the minimal standards of the IMF, and with the lack of institutional 
oversight within the Egyptian government, the conditions were ideal for opportunistic 
businessmen to profit from these reforms if they aligned themselves with the NDP.  
 To oversee the implementation of these reforms and the transfer of state-owned assets to 
privately held holding companies, Mubarak enlisted the help of his son, Gamal. Over the course 
of the economic liberalization reforms, rifts between the new business elite and the military 
establishment manifested themselves almost immediately. While many of the military-owned 
enterprises remained exempt from the reforms, the companies run by the business elite were 
showing signs of improved growth and efficiency. Furthermore, these options were fresh 
opportunities, making them more attractive to foreign investors.147 In an effort to increase his 
own influence within the government, Gamal started the Future Foundation, designed to attract 
prominent businessmen willing to ally themselves with him and take advantage of the new 
reforms. Well known businessmen like Mohammed Abul-Einein, Ahmed Ezz, and Ibrahim 
Kamel, immediately brought, capital, business savvy, and credibility to Gamal’s camp.148 As a 
result, Gamal’s businessmen started working their way into prominent positions that allowed 
them to influence policy, exacerbating divisions in the NDP between the military establishment 
and the new civilian elite. At one point, the divisions were such that Gamal floated the idea of 
starting his own political party, the Future Party. However, the last thing Mubarak wanted was 
the destabilization of the structure due to the introduction of a new and influential political party. 
Instead, the divisions manifested themselves within the NDP.  
 The internal struggle for influence over the NDP did continue; however, and by 2000, 
some 42 percent of the NDP consisted of rising business professionals between the ages of 30-
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40.149 As mentioned before, Mubarak’s continual amendments to the electoral system were 
attempts to balance the regime’s desire to keep political authority with the need to appeal to the 
population to reinforce their legitimacy. Every time reforms were made, the NDP wanted to 
manipulate the application of the changes to work in their favor, like they did with redistricting 
in the 90s. One such change; however, was that the Supreme Constitutional Court moved to have 
judiciary oversight over the election, complicating matters for Mubarak. Rather than circumvent 
the court, Mubarak opted to flood the election with NDP candidates running as both members of 
the party, and as independents. In doing so, Mubarak changed the game. No longer were 
elections going to be manipulated to secure a specific NDP member for a particular position or 
seat. Instead, NDP members now had to run against one another to secure their position within 
the party, pitting the old guard directly against the new guard of the business elite.150 Official 
NDP candidates won 172 seats, NDP independents won 181, while another 35 true independents 
joined party after the election. With more NDP members on the ballot in every race, the strategy 
succeeded, and opposition groups only won 38 seats in the 2000 election.151 The result of the 
elections led to reforms within the NDP. A significant change was Gamal’s suggestion of 
meritocratic candidate selection, essentially creating caucuses that allowed party members to 
internally vote for candidates in the upcoming Consultative Council Polls and local council 
elections.152 By taking advantage of the evolving political system, Gamal’s political faction was 
eventually able to secure a majority on the NDP’s central board, continuing to expand their 
influence over policy and decision-making.  
 
In the United States and many other modern democracies in Europe, a civilian 
government develops economic and security strategies, and oversees the implementation of 
policy as the state pursues its interests. The military is but a tool at the government’s disposal to 
either protect or secure those interests. In Egypt, the structure of the polity is almost reverse, with 
former military presiding over government and military policy. The military seeks to define the 
security and economic interests of the state, while funneling discontent through political 
institutions and by promoting disingenuous social initiatives. The democratic façade that results 
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give opposition groups the perception of legitimate avenues to voice grievances and influence 
policy.153 However, recent unrest in Egypt reveals the limits of the democratic façade to pacify 
internal discontent. Given Egypt’s large and growing population, combined with limited 
resources, discontent is inevitable. Therefore, the last 63 years of military rule in Egypt was 
about balancing state interests with the demands of the populous, each regime employing a 
different strategy to reaffirm their legitimacy, and mitigate the rise of an opposition group that 
could challenge their influence over state policy.154 For Nasser and the Free Officers, nationalism 
provided the military with the tools to nationalize industry and build a single party political 
structure to create a military monopoly of policy making and decision-making. Political and 
economic interests forced Sadat to move away from nationalism to preserve military dominance. 
He did so by privatizing industries within military-owned holdings, relieving the military of the 
burden of governance, and adopting the Islamist identity in an attempt to limit Islamist 
opposition to his policy. With Sadat’s assassination, Mubarak first countered the Islamists with 
emergency powers, but as the Muslim Brotherhood became more moderate, Mubarak had to 
counter their influence with a more political solution.155 Through electoral reforms that included 
redistricting and the addition of independents on the ballot, Mubarak wanted to curb the growing 
presence of Brotherhood and other opposition groups in parliament. With the help of his son, 
Mubarak initiated additional privatization efforts within the economy to create a civilian business 
elite allied to the NDP that could challenge the opposition.156 While the financial elite grew 
threatened the political and economic influence of the old guard, the sacrifice was necessary to 
ensure NDP dominance in parliament.157 The new civilian elite would dilute the ballot boxes and 
act as a counter to the Muslim Brotherhood’s expanding political resource; thus, sustaining the 
political buffer that protected the military’s monopoly on policymaking. 
 From Nasser to Mubarak, the purpose of political and electoral reforms were to adapt to 
shifting political dynamics between the military establishment and the population brought about 
by changing regional/international conditions. Continual adjustments to the political structure 
allowed opposition groups to use local grievances to slowly apply pressure and force further 
amendments to give them more access to the political process. With division within the ruling 
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party, rising opposition influence among the population, and an aging President, the military 
faced considerable challenges to their positon within the state. However, the combination of 
regional events and unexpected political turmoil created the ideal conditions for the military to 
discredit and remove the only significant challengers to their regime.  
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Chapter 4 
Power Relations and the Military’s Arab Spring 
 
The current position of the military in Egyptian society is the result of these continual 
efforts to reshuffle the state’s infrastructure while sustaining the military’s position of influence 
and strength. The expansion of the bureaucracy relieves the military of the burdens of 
governance. While the regime’s influence over the various industries, enterprises, and political 
institutions, makes them well-positioned in all essential sectors of society. Without adequate 
civilian oversight, they can pull many political and economic levers to manipulate legislation to 
make government work in their favor. While recent unrest suggests that there are limitations to 
this strategy, it reveals the fortified positon of the military within the state’s institutional 
infrastructure. It also demonstrates the capability of the military to preserve the regime despite an 
ailing economy and sudden periods of extreme instability. The following chapter will discuss the 
political atmosphere leading up to the Arab Spring unrest, and how the turmoil advanced the 
interests of the military regime.  
In the early 2000s, significant international events presented numerous challenges to the 
Mubarak regime. Al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States on September 11th, 2001, brought 
about an increase of U.S. presence in the region.158 While much of the International community 
supported the U.S. military response in Afghanistan, Washington’s decision to invade Iraq put 
U.S. allies in precarious situation. While Mubarak condemned U.S. military action in Iraq, the 
regime’s eventual support suggests that it was under pressure from the Bush administration to 
participate. Mubarak originally tried to act as an arbiter in negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait, 
but when Iraq invaded it damaged Egypt’s credibility as an effective Arab mediator. The 
economic situation in Egypt was getting worse, and with the failed negotiations, Egypt needed to 
demonstrate Egypt’s indispensability in the region to secure additional sources of external aid.159 
By participating in the Gulf war, Egypt satisfied its U.S. benefactor and improved its relations 
with the Gulf States.160   
At home, the controversial war emboldened Mubarak’s opposition, giving them political 
ammunition to attempt to discredit the region and expand their own influence. Secular opposition 
                                                             
158 STRATFOR: “The Evolving Modern Egyptian Republic: A Special Report” 
159 Hinnebusch and Ehteshami. The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, p. 109, 110 
160 Ibid, p. 110-111 
48 
 
to the Mubarak regime mobilized under the Kefaya movement, while The Muslim Brotherhood 
also increased the frequency and intensity of its rhetoric. The 2005 elections reflect popular 
support for their message, as the Muslim Brotherhood secured 88 seats government, 20 of which 
were in parliament. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, The Brotherhood decided to try and 
increase their political presence by allying themselves with other political parties and fielding 
Independent candidates. Possibly concerned about consecutive Brotherhood gains, Mubarak 
postponed the 2006 local elections for two years as the regime made further amendments to the 
electoral process.161  
In the wake of the 2005 election, the NDP and the regime became less concerned with 
democratic reform, human rights, and political accommodations to the opposition. As a result, 
the crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood increased between 2006 and 2008. This was not 
consistent with U.S. rhetoric regarding democratic transformation in the region, and the U.S. 
congress began threatening to decrease the amount of U.S. aid to Egypt if the regime did not take 
more action to implement democratic reform.162 In 2007, representatives from the Bush 
administration decided to meet with the members of the Brotherhood, bolstering their political 
credibility in Egypt.163 While the regime did institute new political reforms, they did not appear 
to acknowledge U.S. concerns. For the 2008 municipal elections, all independent candidates 
needed the approval of 140 members of local councils, as well as backing from current members 
of parliament in order to be eligible to run.164 As a result, the only political bloc capable of 
benefiting from independent candidates was the NDP.  Prior to 2008 elections, Egyptian security 
forces also arrested hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood members and barred others from 
registering as candidates, forcing the group to boycott the elections. Following these events, the 
government quickly put down any efforts to organize protests, and crackdowns on Brotherhood 
members became even more frequent.165 
Due to increasingly bad economic conditions including inflation, bread shortages, and a 
rise in food and energy prices, there was a substantial amount of public sympathy for the 
Brotherhood. Of course, the Brotherhood took the opportunity to take advantage of these 
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conditions, having their members hand out bread within impoverished communities.166 With 
increasingly bad economic conditions and political fractures developing within the NDP, the 
Muslim Brotherhood appeared poised to take advantage of the materializing political 
opportunities.  
Between 2005 and 2010, the election delays and increased Brotherhood crackdowns were 
a departure from previous strategies to manipulate election results through referendums. The 
deliberate disregard for the democratic façade suggests that the internal rifts between the 
business elite and the old guard of the military were significant enough that the regime felt it 
needed to avoid political entanglements and focus on post-Mubarak uncertainties. Unlike his 
predecessors, Mubarak did not appoint a vice president. With Gamal’s growing influence in 
government, suspicions arose about the possibility of the Presidency being passed from Father to 
son. When Gamal accompanied his father to Washington DC in 2009 to attend Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations, Mubarak appeared to be putting his son’s abilities as a statesman on display.167 
However, in 2010, the sudden unrest in Tunisia and growing support for the Brotherhood within 
Egypt, bolstered the old guard’s case for a military successor 
Although Nasser and Sadat both had sons, the Office of the Presidency still went to 
former military officers. The prospect of Gamal inheriting the Presidency caused many within 
the military to voice their concern over his lack of military service and the potential change in 
procedure.168 Mubarak attempted to compromise, offering the transfer of power to his 
intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, until Gamal was fit to govern.  However, Suleiman’s health 
was in question, and the military establishment was unenthusiastic about such terms. Facing 
opposition from both former military within the NDP and ranking military officers, Mubarak 
decided that he would post-pone the debate by running for President again in 2011.169  
Leading up to the parliamentary elections in late 2010, crackdowns on the Brotherhood 
continued. The regime also denied requests by neutral foreign observers to moderate the 
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elections. Despite these events, many political parties decided to field candidates in the 
November election, including the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the NDP did not intend to 
repeat the 2005 embarrassment. After early indications revealed a large NDP majority, 
opposition groups united in their protest and boycotted the second round of voting in December. 
The boycott by these groups exacerbated existing animosities between organized opposition and 
the government, and reinforced a growing public image of a corrupt Mubarak regime.170  
Initially, the protests were sporadic and confined to communities where specific 
opposition parties and/or candidates were popular. As a result, it appeared that the NDP would 
have the opportunity to continue the succession debate during another Mubarak term. However, 
in January of 2011, the Egyptian population suddenly began to mobilize in protest against the 
regime. Whether due to regional events, the November election results, unresolved grievances, or 
a combination of each, large crowds gathered outside government buildings and reports of 
looting spread throughout Cairo. In late January, Mubarak made several attempts to appease the 
public. One such measure was the announcement of Omar Suleiman as his Vice President in an 
apparent attempt to dispel the fears of a possible Gamal succession plan. Mubarak also appealed 
to the public by claiming that the country would descend into chaos if he suddenly left office, 
and that he would step down the following September after overseeing a transition of power to 
Omar Suleiman.171 When this did not suffice, and local security forces were unable to disperse 
the crowds, Mubarak mobilized the military to restore order. However, both the military and the 
protestors exercised restraint. The opposition then requested formal negotiations with the 
military to discuss a transitional government and the removal of Mubarak. 172 
This turn of events regarding the dynamic between the protestors and the military 
presented a unique opportunity for the military establishment. Instead of having to continue to 
oppose Mubarak and his succession plan, they simply had to stand by and allow the population 
to force him to step down. Once Mubarak and his son were removed from equation, so was much 
of the political capital held by the business class. Now, the challenge for the military would be 
how to manage the Egyptian moderates and the conservative Islamists. 
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Aware of what had led to Mubarak’s downfall, the military wanted to be careful not to 
dictate to a population emboldened by the successful removal of Mubarak. To satisfy both the 
Islamists and the progressives, the military held elections and de-criminalized political parties 
previously outlawed.173 The brevity of the Arab Spring movement did not give previously 
outlawed and/or fledgling opposition groups enough time to create a political platform, organize, 
and communicate practical ideas to the Egyptian populous. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood 
was in a unique positon to capitalize on their influence within society.  
With the arrest of Gamal Mubarak, he and his business elites were no longer viable 
political challengers. While a few were arrested, the military establishment encouraged the rest 
to realign themselves with their interests. As a result, the military institutional and economic 
fiefdoms remained relatively intact. In June 2012, the military had nothing to lose by putting up 
Ahmed Shafiq as a candidate for President in the post-revolution elections.174 Perhaps fearing a 
return to the status quo, many moderates and threw their support behind the Islamists.  
After the Mulsim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi, narrowly beat out Shafiq, the 
military and the Islamist party cooperated to begin drafting a new constitution. Having thrown 
their support behind the Islamists, non-Islamist parties were disappointed when the Brotherhood 
decide to exclude them from the process. As a result, the 2012 constitution contained many of 
the same authoritarian provisions regarding civil-military relations, the structure of government, 
socioeconomic rights, and civil liberties, and religion-state relations.175 In addition, the document 
continued to grant the military institutional fiefdoms exemptions from oversight by elected 
officials or other institutions.176 Furthermore, the new draft left many of the old constitutional 
legal and political framework in place, including those governing the existing political and 
economic structure, trade unions, professional syndicates, and human rights organizations. The 
Muslim Brotherhood even implemented new checks on what it deemed divisive, derogatory, or 
conspiratorial propaganda and/or media. They also disregarded suggestions by activists and 
human rights organizations to restructure institutions like the police and Judiciary. In drafting the 
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2012 constitution, the Brotherhood ignored or sidelined many, if not all, of the original aims of 
the revolution regarding constitutional reform.177 
Morsi and the Brotherhood were unable to dislodge the military fiefdoms and 
government structure, and even their Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) reforms 
were done in cooperation with the military.178 They accommodated the existing business elite, 
allowing the current fiscal policies associated with taxation, public expenditure, and wages to go 
unchanged.179 The Brotherhood even claimed that the Mubarak era policies would be successful 
in implemented by uncorrupted leaders like themselves.180 Thus, instead of replacing the civil-
military state infrastructure, the Brotherhood went to great lengths to position itself inside it. 
Attempting to fortify their political influence and survival, the Brotherhood strategically placed 
their members within the state, executive, municipal, and judicial bureaucracies.181 Morsi also 
quickly appointed an attorney general and interior minister who quickly undertook initiatives to 
detain and prosecute remaining political activists. Morsi also issued a number of decrees, one of 
which stated that the constituent assembly responsible for writing the new constitution could not 
legally be dissolved. When the Judicial branch challenged the decrees, the Brotherhood drafted 
legislation to lower the required retirement age of lower judges, subsequently forcing 
approximately a third of them out of office.182 As the Brotherhood continued this campaign to 
reform the internal workings of government and extend its network of members through the 
bureaucracies, public unrest escalated once again. Not only did Brotherhood members attempt to 
aggressively quell these demonstrations, they disseminated inflammatory propaganda aimed 
religious minorities groups like the Shiites and Coptic Christians, inciting religious violence.183 
The military originally planned to simply co-opt the Brotherhood, letting them govern 
while the military establishment preserved its economic interests and decision-making authority. 
However, the Brotherhood’s choice to exclude and alienate non-Islamist political movements led 
to immediate opposition among the population. This approach disrupted the delicate balance that 
stabilized the state’s infrastructure. Ashraf El-Sharif points out in “Egypt’s Post-Mubarak 
                                                             
177 El-Sherif, Ashraf. “Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Predicament” 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
53 
 
Predicament” that the ideological foundations of the Brotherhood made them unwilling to 
include non-Islamist political movements, and the divergent notions of national interests and 
security made a partnership with the military unrealizable. Furthermore, the incompatibility of 
the Brotherhood’s political ambitions with the basic goals of the revolution led to a return large 
scale demonstrations. 184 
With Islamic interpretations of law and political organization intertwined in Brotherhood 
ideology, their early political maneuvers suggest that they wanted to reform the state in their 
image. Instead of trying to dismantle the regime’s infrastructure by encouraging political 
pluralism, it appears the Brotherhood sought to establish their own pillars of political power 
within the existing system. 185 In doing so, the Brotherhood became a considerable liability that 
endangered the economic and security interests of the state, and the Egyptian military once again 
decided to assert its authority to stabilize the situation.  
Since the military, police, and judiciary institutions remained intact, the military 
establishment had the capability to simply block the Brotherhood’s political actions and force 
them out of office. To do so, the military brought together former allies among the media, 
business class, and political elites. They also made collaborative appeals to the non-Islamist 
political movements and religious minorities that the Brotherhood conveniently alienated. Using 
a more inclusive tone, they were able to orchestrate the removal of the Brotherhood without 
undermining the public’s perception of the military as a neutral institution. The military tried to 
reinforce this public opinion by ushering in former International Atomic Energy Association 
representative and prominent pro-revolution political figure, Mohamed ElBaradei, as Vice 
President in July of 2013.186  
The removal and detainment of Morsi did not come without consequences. By renewing 
the historical discord between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military establishment, the 
military alienated the country’s Islamists. As clashes broke out between the military and 
Brotherhood supporters, ElBaradei continued to make appeals to the organization to return to 
political negotiations. However, the military had no intention to negotiate, initiating an 
aggressive campaign against the Brotherhood with the objective of permanently incapacitating 
what was the most organized and influential opposition group. By undermining appeals by 
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ElBaradei to end the crackdowns, the Vice President resigned to disassociate himself from the 
military’s actions.187  
In the subsequent weeks, military crackdowns on Islamist demonstrations and raids on 
Brotherhood members continued, drawing international and regional attention. By September, 
early estimates indicated that at least 1,000 people, including 100 police officers, died in clashes 
between security forces and Brotherhood supporters.188 The United States threatened to 
reconsider its aid obligations to Egypt if the military and General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi did not 
exercise restraint. 
Following the military’s removal of Morsi, Saudi Arabia encouraged Egypt’s use of force 
against the Brotherhood. Together with the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, these Gulf States 
pledged a combined 12 billion dollars in aid by the end of that month.189 The United States cut in 
half its annual delivery of 1.3 billion dollars that September, but Saudi Arabia pledged to cover 
whatever the U.S. failed to deliver.190 In recent years, the U.S. has directed only 250 million the 
aid funds towards the Egyptian economy, while the rest is allocated to the military. Before the 
Gulf pledged the additional aid, Egypt was on pace to lose 1-2 billion dollars a month.191 Despite 
U.S. cutbacks in aid delivery, the influx of alternative sources suggests that external state actors 
not only have an interest in the stability of Egypt, they are willing to spend a lot of capital to that 
end.  
Since the Free Officers Movement in 1952, the military establishment’s political and 
economic influence evolved in response to both domestic and international pressures. With a 
large population and limited resources, the military regime needed to control the Egyptian 
economy to secure its position of authority. Nasser accomplished this by eliminating the 
Ottoman/colonial era elite through the nationalization of profitable economic sectors. In an 
attempt to relieve internal discontent, he provided social benefits to the population which he paid 
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for using the substantial amounts of aid Egypt received from the superpowers. For Sadat and 
Mubarak, an evolution of this strategy was required. Liberalization of the political and economic 
sectors became necessary to relieve the military of specific governing responsibilities, and to 
meet conditions by the U.S. to ensure a consistent flow of aid. Through various means of legal 
manipulation, the military establishment put themselves in a position of oversight in both the 
political and economic sectors of society. In this way, the military created a buffer between them 
and the bureaucracy while maintaining permanent ties to important institutions. The structure 
enables the military to present itself as politically neutral. As a result, the military establishment 
is now remarkably resistant to political fluctuation. However, the growing population and fragile 
economy makes their position increasingly reliant on their ability to secure external sources of 
aid to stabilize the economy and maintain security capabilities.  
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Chapter 5 
Regional Interests and the Role of Egypt in Stability 
 
In Steven Cook’s Ruling but not Governing, Cook argues that the Egyptian military 
maintains a “flexible authoritarian order” by deflecting internal opposition through layers of 
pseudo-democratic institutions that insulate the military establishment from political criticism. In 
his conclusion, Cook states: 
It is unfashionable in the Middle East to acknowledge publicly the importance of external actors 
for fear that this may be construed as an effort to impose democracy from abroad. 
However…interested outside parties can use a combination of incentives and political 
benchmarks to encourage a democratic transition. Without an external catalyst for change it is 
likely that familiar patterns of authoritarian politics will endure in military-dominated states like 
Egypt and Algeria.192  
 
Instead, external states pledged a significant amount of aid to Egyptian military following 
the overthrow of the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood. Rather than take the 
opportunity to promote a grassroots movement for political pluralism, many external state actors 
opted for Egyptian military governance.  
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
The current standing of Saudi-Egypt relations is a consequence of recent events that 
effect the security and stability of the Saudi regime. Due to Saudi Arabia’s economic strength, 
the state’s primary interests are security related. When examining the strengths and 
vulnerabilities of the Saudi regime, there are several unique characteristics of the state that 
influence how it pursues interests. Saudi Arabia is very large in proportion to its population, one-
quarter of which consists of non-citizen migrant workers. The Saudi military is relatively weak 
compared to its regional neighbors, such as Iran or Turkey. Saudi Arabia is one of the region’s 
largest economies because it is the world’s largest exporter of oil, and sits on a quarter of the 
world’s known reserves.193 The Saudi regime also derives its legitimacy from the Sunni Islamic 
Identity, and two of the Islam’s most holy cities, Mecca and Medina, lie within its sovereign 
territory. Due to these factors, Saudi Arabia pursues its security interests by preventing the rise 
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of regional hegemons, forging important international relationships, and pacifying internal 
discontent. The intent of this strategy is to protect the state from invasion and safeguard the 
regime from internal instability. Currently, Islamic opposition and militant groups, Syria, and 
Iran are Saudi Arabia’s primary threats. While stability around the Suez Canal is important for 
Saudi oil to reach U.S. and European markets, Saudi Arabia’s primary interests in Egypt’s 
stability relates to the Islamic opposition, Sunni militant groups, and Shi’ite militant groups 
associated with Iran.  
In recent years, Saudi Arabia approached foreign policy on three different levels 
simultaneously. First, the international level, with Saudi Arabia’s strategic relationship with the 
United States. Second, at the regional level, Saudi Arabia uses its economic and political capital 
to play an important balancing role among more militarily powerful neighbors. Third, the 
Arabian Peninsula level, asserting an almost hegemonic role over Gulf Monarchies within its 
sphere of influence.194 Given that Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy derives from its Islamic identity, the 
regime faces domestic and regional challenges to this religious legitimacy due to its enormous 
wealth and relationship with the United States. In order to advance its security interests, Saudi 
Arabia must address the dual demands of both the state and Arab/Islamic identities. Only 
recently did events make a former rival like Egypt an important element of this strategy. 
For the Saudi regime, Egypt has not always been a natural ally. As mentioned previously, 
in the 1950’s and 60’s, Gamal Nasser’s regional ambitions and Pan-Arab nationalist rhetoric 
were a direct threat to the Saudi regime. To counter the allure of Pan-Arab nationalism, the 
Saudi’s established a network of mosques, businesses, and charitable organizations to further the 
Salafist Islamic identity. Through this network, the Saudi regime could influence the internal 
dynamics of other states by funding Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the 
region. From 1962 to 1970, Yemen became the ideological battleground between Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia. Limited support from Britain and the United States allowed Saudi Arabia to hold 
off the Pan-Arab Egyptian threat. While the conflict in Yemen did contribute to a weakening of 
the Pan-Arab nationalism, the Israeli victory over Egypt and its allies in the ’67 war destroyed 
Nasser’s ambitions to use the identity to unify Arab states and bring them under Egyptian 
influence. Although the U.S. supported Saudi Arabia against Egypt, economic interests and the 
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demands of the Arab/Islamic identities led the Saudi regime to defy the U.S. only three years 
later for their support of Israel in the October War of 1973.195 
Saudi Arabia capability to act with autonomy in pursuit of interests comes from its 
leverage over the price of oil. American oil companies discovered oil in Saudi Arabia in 1938; 
however, the regime did not gain its leverage over the oil market until it nationalized Arabian-
American Oil Company (ARAMCO) in 1973, allowing it to accrue all of the state’s oil revenue. 
The Saudi embargo on the U.S. also took advantage of its increasing dependence on foreign 
sources of oil (22% in 1970 to 36 % in 1973).196 With state control over Saudi petroleum 
resources, the regime no longer had to negotiate with private domestic oil interests. As a result, 
international actors, like the U.S, could not bypass the regime by dealing with a private oil entity 
within the country. Furthermore, the Saudi regime’s influence in OPEC was a significant foreign 
policy tool, as it allowed the Saudis to manipulate the global price of oil. This leverage led Saudi 
Arabia to and arrange with the Nixon Administration to essentially buy promises of security and 
military aid from the United States.197 The arrangement involved binding U.S. currency to Saudi 
Arabian oil. Saudi Arabia would agree to sell oil on the global market only in exchange for U.S. 
dollars, and tolerate U.S. support for Israel. By 1976, all the OPEC nations also agreed to sell oil 
using U.S. dollars. In return, the United States agreed to defend the regime against all foreign 
invaders, and supply the necessary military aid for the regime to defend itself from internal 
threats.  
Securing the United States as an ally provided many economic and military benefits to 
the Saudi regime. With the United States’ strong navy and high demand for the resource, they are 
not only a consistent buyer, they also have the capability to protect the sea lanes of 
communication that allow Saudi Arabia to export oil to the international market. As a result, 
Saudi Arabia does not need to spend money on a defense budget to maintain a large navy, nor 
does it depend upon its neighboring states to export their resource over land. Relieved of those 
burdens, Saudi Arabia is able to maximize revenue and exercise political autonomy within the 
region. The security guarantees from the United States also protect the regime from foreign 
invasion, limiting the regime’s need for a large standing army that could potentially threaten the 
monarchy. With the alliance, the regime can rely on a smaller, more specialized force, loyal to 
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the regime. With U.S. training and advanced military hardware, Saudi Arabia now has the 
capability to use this limited but effective tool to protect its interests and project influence over 
its gulf neighbors, as well as defend the regime against any threats that emerge from within. 
Before the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi family did not require security 
assurances from the United States, nor did it have excess revenue necessary to pacify local 
discontent. Their only way to exercise control was through religious authority, given to the 
House of Saud through a close relationship with ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the architect of the Salafi 
brand of Islam in the 1700s. Salafism is a traditional brand of Sunni Islam that, Salafist argue, 
adheres to principles and practices of the earliest Muslims.198 With strict religious codes, 
adherence to the Salafi Islam requires personal sacrifice and submission. For this reason, many 
Salafist believe representative government is too flexible, corruptible, and secular, contrary to 
the consistency and purity of Sharia.199 Consequently, the Saudi Regime proliferates this 
interpretation to further legitimize and protect their control over government. 
While Saudi Arabia uses organizations to spread the Salafism in order to expand its 
religious influence, a primary concern of the regime originates from militant Sunni organizations 
like al-Qaeda, and Iranian backed Shiite groups like the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Both call for 
the regime’s destruction, and continually exhibit a willingness to use violence against Saudi 
Arabia and its allies. 200However, less violent groups like the Muslim Brotherhood can also be a 
threat when they challenge the legitimacy of the Saudi regime and question its religious 
authority.  
While the Muslim Brotherhood did have close ties with the regime until recently, their 
rise to power in Egypt revealed how such an organization with influence over the population 
could use the democratic process as an avenue towards political significance. By promoting itself 
as a moderate opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood gained legitimacy, and was able to use 
its religious influence to pursue political recourse. Perhaps emboldened by the events in Tunisia 
and Egypt, the Saudi branch of the Brotherhood openly called for democratic reforms in Saudi 
Arabia, even promoting a “day of rage” protest in Riyadh on March 11, 2011. The potential of 
democratic reform in Saudi Arabia undermines the self-promoted religious authority and 
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political legitimacy of the monarchy. By posturing as a political opposition group and potential 
religious alternative to authoritarian regimes, the Brotherhood positioned itself as a direct threat 
to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies. Furthermore, Qatar’s support for the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt challenged Saudi supremacy in the Gulf. For such reasons, Saudi Arabia 
vehemently opposed the democratic experiment in Egypt, and supported the military’s removal 
of President Morsi and the additional crackdowns on the Brotherhood. 201 
While the Brotherhood emerged as a viable threat to the Saudi regime, the Kingdom has 
another reason to improve its relations with the Egyptian military. Currently, the largest state 
threat to the Saudi regime is the Shiite government in Iran. As Saudi Arabia derives legitimacy 
from its strict Sunni identity, the Mullahs in Iran derive their right to rule from their Shiite 
heritage. As discussed earlier in the work, the foundation of these Islamic sects differ in regards 
to the inheritance of religious authority in Islam. After almost 1500 years, the dispute appears to 
be irreconcilable, as Saudi Arabia and Iran still actively oppose one another along these sectarian 
lines.202 Although Sunni Muslims are about an 85 percent majority worldwide, 2 of the 3 largest 
oil producing countries in the region, Iran and Iraq, contain a majority Shiite population. Saudi 
Arabia is the third, and as shown in Figure 1, their Shiite minority inconveniently resides in the 
oil-producing Eastern Province of the state.203  
 
(Figure 1.) 
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204 
 
Saudi Arabia attempts to secure its borders via friendly relationships with neighboring 
monarchies in Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. Through the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), the Saudi regime influences policy within the Arabian Peninsula. 
However, allies like Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates do have relevant Shiite 
populations susceptible to Iranian manipulation. With a Shiite led government now in Iraq, 
Iranian influence in the region is expanding, and militant groups opposed to the Saudi regime are 
openly operating in areas like Yemen, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, all of which are in close proximity 
to Saudi Arabia.205 With Iranian influence growing to the north and east, Saudi Arabia does not 
want another religious regime in Egypt challenging its legitimacy from the west. 
Although the U.S. relationships appears to address Saudi interests, the regime needs to be 
reassured that U.S. security guarantees are credible, as the arrangement also presents a number of 
additional security risks. The United States openly supports Israel, and while Israel and Saudi 
Arabia share some specific enemies, Saudi Arabia must present itself as an opponent of the 
Jewish state in order to maintain its legitimacy. Furthermore, the Obama administration’s recent 
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responses to Egypt, Syria, and Iran have been contrary to Saudi interests. In Egypt, the U.S. did 
nothing to protect its former allies in the Egyptian regime, and allowed an opposition group 
hostile to the Saudi regime to rise to political power. The U.S. also initiated negotiations with 
Saudi Arabia’s primary regional threat, Iran, Furthermore, U.S. unwillingness to make good on 
its promise to intervene in a destabilized Syria. As a result, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iran, 
sought to protect and advance their own interests by trying to influence the outcome of the 
Syrian civil war via proxy militant groups.206  
With both internal and external threats, the Saudi regime must weigh and evaluate each 
threat independently, acting in accordance to its interests under those specific circumstances. In 
Egypt, they opposed the rise of the Brotherhood because of the group’s challenges to Saudi 
legitimacy.  While Saudi support for affiliated Islamist groups in Syria might seem contradictory, 
the Assad regime is historically hostile to Saudi Arabia, and remains a close ally of the Shiite 
government in Iran. If the U.S. fails to acknowledge Saudi security interests, they are forced to 
wield their economic power in an attempt to influence regional events.   
With its considerable influence over the world’s most valuable commodity, Saudi Arabia 
could potentially court another security benefactor if the international balance of power 
experiences a shift. The most likely alternative to the U.S. is Russia. However, Russia’s history 
of support for Iran and Syria make it a questionable substitute, and the sectarian battle over 
identity between these regional actors does not appear to be going anywhere. Unfortunately for 
the Saudi regime, the sometimes fickle nature of U.S. of foreign policy has put it in a precarious 
security situation. The Arab Spring and its effects on Egypt shed light on the potential lack of 
U.S. commitment to security obligations, and the expansion of Iranian influence might 
emboldened Shiite oppositions groups within the Saudi sphere of influence.207 The Saudis would 
also like to avoid the return of a democratic experiment in Egypt, as shared identity unites 
religious opposition groups in both countries. The prospect of such groups achieving democratic 
victories in Egypt might embolden their affiliates in Saudi Arabia. At the moment, Egypt’s 
secular military regime is not threat to Saudi Arabia’s religious authority.  As a result, the Saudi 
regime will likely continue to encourage the Egyptian military’s influence government. If 
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instability returns to Egypt, Saudi Arabia’s recent behavior suggests that they provide additional 
aid to help the Egyptian military stabilize the situation, regardless of potential U.S. 
condemnation. Saudi Arabia’s support for Egypt is evidence that the regime will act 
autonomously if it perceives the U.S. as unwilling to acknowledge Saudi security interests. This 
is because Saudi Arabia understand that while U.S. legitimacy demands that it support 
democracy, their mutual interests require stability.208  
 
Israel 
 
Like the other Middle Eastern regimes, Israel faces internal and external threats that stem 
from identity. Despite its small size, Israel has one of the largest economies in the region behind 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia. However, its small sovereign territory and the concentration of its 
population make security a primary interest of the state. The concern with security is exacerbated 
by the presence of conflicting identities and unresolved territorial disputes.209 For Israel, Egypt is 
an important strategic partner because cooperation lends it legitimacy and additional security 
along its southern border. With a reduced threat of invasion from the south, Israel can focus more 
on asymmetric threats from southern Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, as well as hostile 
states to the east. Furthermore, the U.S. encourages this relationship with a considerable amount 
of aid that advances each state’s economic and security interests.210 While the Egyptian military 
regime understand the benefits of the peace, Israel is aware of its lack of popularity within Arab 
populations. As a result, Israel is unenthusiastic about the prospect of democracy in Egypt, as 
fluctuations in government could threaten the current cooperative nature of the relationship and 
potentially renew hostilities between the two states.211  
Israel’s national security and foreign policies derive from a historical context associated 
with both identity and statehood. The regional threats to the Jewish State materialized 
immediately following the establishment of Israel in 1948. From the outset of Cold War, the 
United States and the Soviet Union understood the strategic value of influencing the Levant, and 
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believed that the establishment of a Jewish state might work to their advantage. Initially, The 
Soviet Union thought their influence in the Levant would result from a level of ideological 
affinity, as many of the Jews migrating to the region were from Eastern Europe and Russia. On 
the contrary, the United States felt their influence over Israel would come from their instrumental 
role in the formation of the Jewish state. However, with the emerging superpowers still occupied 
with the post-war Europe, the development of their diplomatic and military strategies towards the 
region were gradual. 
For Israel, the regional conditions were instantly hostile. Surrounding populations 
interpreted the creation of the Jewish state as an affront to their religious and ethnic identities, 
believing they had historical claims to the territory. Arab regimes embraced the irredentism 
because it united them against Israel, and allowed them to shift public discontent to an external 
enemy. To counter the threat, Israel played off of the superpower ambitions of the Soviet Union 
by securing an arms deal to supply Israeli forces in the war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.212 
Access to warm water ports is a traditional foreign policy goal of Russia, as it advances their 
economic and security interests. By supplying the Israelis, the Soviet Union hoped to gain an 
immediate foothold in the Mediterranean.213 However, Israel did not want to sacrifice autonomy 
by becoming reliant on the Soviet Union, so after their victory against the Arab coalition, Israel 
sought help from the French to expand their list of benefactors. Already embroiled in conflict in 
Algeria, the French were attempting to retain their colonial sphere of influence in the region. 
With their historical presence in the Levant, military support for Israel became an element of that 
strategy. The rise of nationalism and the exercising of autonomy among Arab states threatened 
the survival of the Jewish state, and countered European ambitions in the region. This is evident 
in the collaboration between Israel, France, and Britain to topple the Nasser regime in Egypt and 
secure the Suez Canal during the Suez Crisis of 1956.214 
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal to gain sovereignty over the sea lane and extract the 
economic benefits. Britain saw this move as a direct threat to their economic security and an 
affront to their traditional influence in the region, and as a result, they wanted to end Nasser’s 
rule in Egypt. France, already engaged with nationalist enemies in Algeria, agreed to aid the 
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Israelis who wanted to diminish the military capabilities of an emboldened Nasser, and create a 
buffer in the Sinai between Egyptian forces and Israel’s southern border. The invasion and 
collaboration of the three states was not in U.S. interests; however, who were attempting to assert 
their influence in the region and court Nasser’s nationalist movement into an alliance against the 
communist ideology of the Soviet Union. 
With the French withdrawal from Algeria, and a realignment of French policy in the 
Middle East, Israel needed a new ally. The U.S. understood the Soviet Union’s desire for access 
to the Mediterranean; therefore, keeping Israel from seeking Soviet patronage was essential. This 
reality coincided with the death of Nasser in 1970 and an attempt by Egypt in 1973 to drive 
Israel out of the Sinai that ended in a stalemate.215 For Anwar Sadat, the political situation was 
fragile. The allure of Pan-Arab nationalism was fading following costly wars with Israel, the 
failure of the United Arab Republic, and Nasser’s death. Arab regimes needed to make a 
substantial shift in policy to address immediate security interests, presenting a unique 
opportunity for Israel to influence the terms of peace with its neighbors.  
The economic and political cost of war with Israel made it difficult for the Arab regimes 
to remain united in their opposition to the Jewish state. Syria was in a precarious situation 
because the legitimacy of the Assad regime relied upon Arab nationalism and the liberation of 
the Palestinian people. They insisted on a comprehensive peace agreement that would include 
Egypt because the Assad regime could not abandon the nationalist identity needed to unite a 
predominately Sunni country behind the ruling Alawi minority.216 By institutionalizing 
nationalism and incorporating it into the Ba’ath party ideology, losing Egypt as an Arab ally 
would severely weaken the legitimacy of the regime. However, Israel had no real interests in 
peace with the hostile state. The Golan Heights were the only strategically valuable bargaining 
chip in the negotiations, and Israel already took possession of the geographical feature.217 
However, for the sake of Israel’s security interests, Egypt was a much more attractive partner for 
peace. 
Since the pillar of the Egyptian regime is a secular military regime and a bourgeoisie that 
profits from peace and economic stability, they do not have to rely on nationalism for legitimacy. 
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Disagreements over previous weapons deals with that Soviets also left the Egyptian military 
disappointed with that relationship; thus, Egypt needed a more reliable economic and security 
benefactor to ease the burdens on the weakened regime.218 
By successfully negotiating a peace with Anwar Sadat, Israel dismantled the Pan-Arab 
nationalist bloc united against them. Furthermore, occupation of the Sinai did not necessarily 
advance the security interests of Israel because it extended their military and its supply lines. 
Instead, surrendering the natural buffer between the states was favorable combined with 
concessions that regulate Egyptian military presence in the peninsula. For Israel, the peace 
accord reduces the threat of invasion from the south, and secures the United States as a military 
and economic benefactor.219  
Throughout Israel’s existence, the quest for security led the state to make relationships 
with external benefactors to derive the economic and security benefits associated with the 
arrangement. Initially, it was the Soviet Union, then the French, and now the United States. 
Currently, Israel is the largest beneficiary of U.S. economic and military aid in the world. This 
relationship allows Israel to maintain a strong economy by offsetting military costs while 
developing a healthy technological industry regarded as one of the most advanced in the world. 
In 1996, Israel’s gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately 50 percent greater than the 
combined GDPs of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Israel’s economic strength, combined with 
advanced technological and military capabilities is a considerable element of Israel’s stability 
and security, as both create leverage over their Arab neighbors. Without a benefactor like the 
United States, that advantage diminishes.220 
As a U.S. ally, Israel’s aggressive behavior is occasionally a liability for the United 
States, but the existence of the relationship implies that Israel has no ambitions to become a 
regional hegemon. The U.S. must prevent the rise of regional hegemons that could threaten their 
own interests in the Middle East. A regional hegemon with significant military capabilities and a 
strong economy would also be a competitor and potential threat to the existence of Israel. 
Without regional hegemons, economic and military advantages give Israel the flexibility to 
manage regional relationships with other states exclusively, each with their own level of 
cooperation, hostility and threat capability. Rather than more inclusive and multilateral 
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arrangements, dissimilar state-to-state relationships comprised of unique conditions allow Israel 
to address specific areas of mutual interests, while also maintaining a defensive military posture 
intended to deter aggressive behavior. Israel reinforces this deterrent with a non-disclosed 
nuclear weapon’s program and calculated displays of it military capability through precision 
strikes and targeted campaigns against specific individuals, groups, or objectives associated with 
a potential threat or provocateur. Such targeted strikes include the 1981 attack on the Osirak 
nuclear reactor in Iraq, the bombing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization headquarters in 
Tunisia in 1985, an attack on a Syrian nuclear facility in 2007, multiple campaigns in southern 
Lebanon against Hezbollah, operations in Gaza, as well as numerous assassinations and airstrikes 
against other perceived threats.221 Despite the international condemnation associated with this 
aggressive national security policy, the October War of 1973 was the last military assault against 
Israel involving conventional forces from neighboring states. The lack of multi-lateral peace 
arrangements isolates the conditions of each and makes it more difficult to build a united Arab 
coalition against them, while the aggressive military posture demonstrates the potential cost of 
resuming hostilities.222  
Israel prevented military confrontation in the Middle East since 1978 using this policy of 
divide and deter. However, the apparent Arab-Israeli conflict continues to be a destabilizing 
factor in the region. The reason is the presence of the Palestinian territories and conflicting 
interpretations of sovereignty associated with Israeli identity. Identity in Israel is destabilizing 
because both Zionists and practical realists appear to prioritize the security interests of the state, 
creating the perception of unity among the Israeli population regarding national security. 
However, inconsistencies arise on the question of Israeli sovereignty because the Palestinian 
territories are not recognized as by sovereign boundary. The Israelis and Palestinians did 
mutually recognize one another during the Oslo accords signed in 1993, and led to the 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Palestinian territories and grant them the right to 
self-govern.223 However, the boundaries are not sovereign, and the combination of Zionist 
ambitions and the border ambiguity creates a situation where the secular and ideological interests 
of the state are incompatible.  
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Many nationalities and ethnicities exist worldwide that happen to be Christian, Muslim, 
etc. For Jewish people, their religious and ethnic identities appear to be more intertwined. Prior 
to Israel’s creation, the Jewish identity was a target for eradication. The result was a transmission 
of an aggressive defensive posture that currently influences the state of Israel’s approach to 
national security, often leading to destabilizing policies that are uncharacteristic of states in a 
realist system.224 The internal instability within the Jewish state involves an attempt to reconcile 
interests influenced by the Zionist identity, and the more secular realist concerns regarding the 
security of the state. The threat posed by Zionism within Israel is its influence on foreign policy, 
and the destabilizing effects their aggressive defensive posture has on the region.225  
A cornerstone of the Zionist identity is irredentism regarding Jewish sovereignty over the 
Levant. Zionists believe in the establishment of a Jewish homeland in the Levant, with Jerusalem 
as the capital, as described in their Torah. These biblical boundaries incorporate the territories in 
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, parts of southern Lebanon, and the disputed Golan Heights along 
Israel’s border with Syria. Zionist do not want to absorb the Palestinian community and grant the 
Arab’s Israeli citizenship because it would reduce the Jewish political majority and diminish the 
Jewish identity of the state.226 However, Israelis that focus on the geopolitical complexity of their 
situation in the region believe that preserving the Jewish state requires a more secular approach 
to interests and regional relationships.227 Yitzhak Rabin was one such individual.  
Much of Israel’s progress towards cooperation with Arab neighbors is due to what Rabin 
accomplished, and Israel’s continued participation in the peace process suggests that some 
Israelis believe Zionist ambitions are actually a risk to the security of the Jewish state.228 If 
Israeli’s support a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian issue, then they expect their government 
to negotiate that peace. Rabin’s military background and service as Defense Minister before his 
tenure as Prime Minister made him popular, and led few to question his loyalty to Israel. 
However, during his tenure as Prime Minisert from 1992 to ’95, he appeared to stress territorial 
compromise as means to obtaining greater security. While he rejected international pressure for 
Israel to return to pre-1967 borders, he did declare at a Labor Party convention in 1991 that Israel 
should prepare to forfeit “many kilometers” of territory to advance peace with regional 
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neighbors.229 Before his assassination in 1995, Rabin condoned and influenced the Oslo accord 
process initiated by Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin and continued by Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres. He also went to great lengths to negotiate a treaty with Damascus, offering to 
surrender some of the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a more permanent peace. 
Apparently, Rabin’s framework for peace with the Assad regime in Syria also included the 
establishment of diplomatic ties, and a withdrawal of Israel from the rest of the territory to make 
it a demilitarized zone.230 Syria’s Assad did not accept the terms of the agreement, but Rabin’s 
efforts to reconcile the Palestinian issue and improve relationships with Arab neighbors were 
significant enough to gain recognition from the International community. In 1994, Rabin shared 
the Nobel Peace Prize with other leaders involved in the process.231 Despite this, his actions 
remained a point of contention in Israel because the Zionists opposed the surrender of occupied 
territories, as well as the other concessions associated with the Oslo negotiations.   
Since Rabin, other Israeli Prime Ministers, including Ehud Barak (1999-2001) and Ehud 
Olmert (2006-2009), attempted to use the Golan Heights as a bargaining chip in peace 
negotiations with Syria; however, all of these negotiations failed and Israel continues to occupy 
the territory.232 The Golan Heights have significant strategic importance because they are an 
elevated, and easily defendable geographic feature that would put many Israeli populations 
centers well within the range of Syrian heavy weapons platforms and/or Iranian-made rockets 
used by Islamist groups. With an unstable Syria and current hostilities with the Assad regime, 
maintaining the Golan is a strategic buffer Israel will hold to counter any threats from Syria. 
Northwest of the Golan, the Iranian backed Shi’ite group, Hezbollah, launches occasional attacks 
on Israel from southern Lebanon. 233 Hamas and Sunni Arab Islamists groups attack from the 
Palestinian territories to the east and south. While these groups pose a threat to individual Israeli 
citizens, without significant assistance from a state entity, they represent a marginal threat to the 
survival of the Israeli state. However, a persisting Palestinian issue and the aggressive Israeli 
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response appears to be eroding the Jewish State’s political capital, gradually creating unstable 
conditions that could threaten the survival of the state.234  
As condemnation within the international community continues to grow, populations 
voice their displeasure, putting additional stress on neighboring regimes. Lebanon is currently 
controlled by a government designed to deter sectarian division; however, the lack of decisive 
leadership makes it weak, enabling Hezbollah to continue to influence the state’s southern border 
with Israel. The current monarchy in Jordan relies upon good relations with Israel to advance its 
security interests and secure aid from the U.S. However, the recent Arab Spring threatened to 
destabilize Jordan, and the monarchy faced large demonstrations organized by Islamist 
opposition affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite political and military cooperation 
over the past decade, Israel’s relationship with Turkey continues to deteriorate since 2010.235 
That year, activist groups launched aid flotillas to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza, and three 
activists were killed when Israeli commandos met violent resistance as they boarded the ships. 
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan loudly condemned Israel, and since then the rhetoric out of 
Ankara is increasingly hostile.236 While the secular Turkish military continues to have to 
cooperate with Israel, the Turkish political system resembles a democracy.237 Currently, the 
Turkish government is in the hands of the Islamist party affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood 
and sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. As a result, any cooperation with Israel (or lack there-
of) will remain a politically relevant topic, so Israel expects the occasional unfriendly 
government in Ankara. Democracy encourages shifts in policies and opinions, but because 
Lebanese and Syrian territory between Turkey and Israel, Turkey poses little threat to Israel’s 
security. 238 However, Israel’s current cooperation with President Sisi suggests that they have no 
desire for such political inconsistency in Egypt.  
The secular military regime in Egypt provides an anchor for Israeli security, as they are a 
secular institution, have a strong military hostile to Islamic opposition, and they remain 
influential amongst Arab populations. Their consistent involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process as a mediator lends both states international credibility. The two states also share a 
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significant ally in the United States, and the monarchies in Jordan and the Gulf States face 
similar threats from Islamist opposition groups. For the security interests of the state, Israel, sees 
this network of mutual interests and common threats as a protection from potential invasion, and 
a counter to Iran and Syria.239  
Due to the instability in Syria, the already defensive Israelis will likely remain 
preoccupied with security. Therefore, the security of the Jewish state depends on the identity 
conflict between Zionism and the secular state interests of Israel. The identity conflict effects 
relations with neighboring states because of the influence it has over Israel’s definition of state 
boundaries, perception of threats, and the aggressiveness of their defense.240  
Even if negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians were to result in the 
establishment of a two state solution, the significance of the Egyptian relationship would remain. 
The conditions of poverty in Palestine would likely last for several years, as even the most 
successful economic strategies are gradual. 241 Similarly, Middle Eastern regimes would likely 
continue to deflect internal discontent with anti-Israel rhetoric, and it is doubtful that Islamist 
groups who oppose Israel’s existence will change their position due to the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. As a result, cooperation between the two states would still be in their best 
interests because there is no guarantee that a two state solution would stabilize the region, or 
improve Israel’s relations with other regional actors.  
The cooperation between the Israeli and Egyptian militaries, combined with Jordan’s 
maintenance of Palestinian refugee camps, helps limit the amount of illicit money, weapons, and 
human traffic entering Gaza and the West Bank.242 Therefore, Israel’s current cooperative 
relationships with the two states will remain a significant part of Israel’s security. Israel would 
prefer the military regime in Egypt because democracy could destabilize the relationship. At 
best, it would resemble Israel’s current relationship with Turkey, and any draw down in military 
cooperation might result in an increase of militant capabilities in the Palestinian territories. More 
activity would likely result in Israeli reprisals, only aggravating local hostilities towards Israel. 
Since opposition to Israel is already popular in Egypt, the worst case scenario for Israel is that a 
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democratically elected government might eventually seek to bolster its credibility by abolishing 
the peace treaty signed by Sadat.  
Before the peace, the Egyptian military regime and Israel knew nothing but conflict. With 
the presence of militant groups, conflicts regarding identity, and mutual preoccupations with 
security and stability, nullifying the peace would likely destabilize the region. If such a scenario 
did materialize, much would depend on how much influence the Egyptian military retained over 
foreign policy, and whether or not they would reassure the Israelis with indirect negotiations in 
an attempt to continue cooperation. Even as a symbolic political gesture by a new Egyptian 
government, an end to the peace would create a complicated diplomatic situation As a result, 
Israel’s security interests would require them to take a more aggressive defensive posture on 
their southern border.243   
 
United States 
 
Before WWII, the United States had little interest in the Middle East.244 The U.S. had 
sufficient domestic oil production to meet the local demand, so the influences on U.S. policy in 
the region were the interests of oil companies and U.S. allies in the West, primarily Britain. 
Middle Eastern governments were eager to take advantage of the valuable newly discovered 
resource, but needed the knowledge and expertise of experienced oil companies to develop the 
necessary infrastructure to produce and export it. Post WWI, European governments still had 
many of their colonial era tendencies, and collaborated and competed with American oil 
companies to negotiate generous contracts with the fledgling Middle Eastern states.245 Eager for 
the potential revenue and legitimacy, young regimes made arrangements with oil companies that 
bordered on the lines of exploitation, and grievances intensified as local populations witnessed 
jobs and profits going to foreigners. Of course, regimes deflected the criticism by blaming 
European governments and Euro/American oil companies, associating Americans with the anti-
colonial feelings of the time.246  
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WWII was a turning-point for U.S. policy in the Middle East because it highlighted the 
strategic significance of oil, and that access to such strategic positions and resources is as 
important as preventing adversaries to them. Oil was not only essential for modern militaries, but 
as modernization led to an increase in international demand, it became an essential commodity 
within the global marketplace. Thus, influencing the supply became a cornerstone of U.S. policy 
to gain leverage over the global economy during the Cold War. As tensions with the Soviet 
Union mounted, so did U.S. commitment to the Middle East. 
Over the course of the Cold War, the United States sought to contain the spread of 
communist influence worldwide. In the Middle East, that meant promoting stability in the region 
and establishing strong ties with regimes with strategic significance. As mentioned before, the 
United States and the Soviet Union had sufficient domestic oil supplies; however, U.S. allies did 
not. The oil trade was not only important to give U.S. allies access to supply but it acted as a 
foundation to the free-market system that built ties between capitalist states, while alienating the 
Soviet Union for the global economy.247 As a result, the United States sought to repair its 
relations, stabilize, and project influence over the Middle East. The 1954 National Security 
Council report entitled, “United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East”, 
reflected such goals when it incorporated the following:  
 
· Availability to the United States and its allies of the resources, the strategic position, and 
the passage rights of the area and denial of such resources and strategic positions to the 
Soviet bloc. 
 
· Settlement of major issues between Arab states and Israel as a foundation for establishing 
peace and order in the area. 
 
· Reversal of the anti-American trends of Arab opinion.248 
 
As the Cold War evolved, so did U.S. goals in the Middle East. Regional dynamics and 
shifting coalitions had the U.S. searching for consistent allies in the region. Early on, Iran and 
Israel became the most reliable, as Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan were 
occasionally changing their allegiances to balance one another.249  
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As the rivalry with the Soviets continued, aid to U.S. allies and the arms race between the 
superpowers put stress on the value of U.S. currency. Rather than rely on the material in which 
money is made, the value of modern currency derives from the relationship between the supply 
and demand of a physical commodity. After WWII, the allies agreed to fix their exchange rates 
within 1 percent of one another by pledging to buy and sell U.S. dollars. In return, the U.S. 
agreed to sell gold at a fixed market price of $35 an ounce to all countries that agreed to this 
proposal. The U.S. had an abundance of the metal at the time, but as international monetary 
conditions changed, the United States had a hard time keeping enough gold on the open-market 
to keep the price of gold from going above $35 an ounce.250 However, as the unsustainability of 
maintaining the gold standard became apparent, Nixon negotiated the Petro-dollar arrangement 
with Saudi Arabia to prevent the dollar from becoming a fiat currency (not backed by a physical 
commodity). Backing U.S. currency with oil from the Gulf States (specifically Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait) did not change U.S. policy in the region; however, it did magnify the strategic value of 
the region in regards to U.S. interests.251  
Originally, U.S. interest in the Middle East entailed protecting access to oil in the region 
for the sake of U.S. allies, and preventing the spread of communist influence. Since leftist 
ideologies often coincided with revolutionary sentiments in a population, stability was important 
for the application of this strategy. As a result, the U.S. prioritized the formation of stable 
governments through military and economic aid, and promises to renew efforts to resolve the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.252 With the additional security obligations to protect the Saudi regime (and 
its ally, Kuwait), the U.S. insured that their interests in the region would transcend the initial 
Cold War objectives.253 Soon after this arrangement, U.S. involvement in the Iran Iraq war and 
the preoccupation with Iranian affairs following the overthrow of Reza Shah, also reflect the re-
doubling of U.S. efforts in the region.254  
Before Iran’s revolution in1979, it was a strategic ally to the U.S. because Reza Shah’s 
secular approach to government, and Iran’s proximity to the Soviet Union. Iran also had a 
domestic supply of oil that the United States wanted to keep out of Soviet hands, and their pro-
western regime was conducive to U.S. interests in the regime. However, the unaddressed 
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grievances within the regime led the emergence of an opposition that rallied around the Shiite 
religious identity.255 Due to the United States’ support of the Shah, the opposition sacked the 
U.S. Embassy on April 1st, 1979, took Americans hostage, and replaced the Shah with a new 
Shiite leadership.256 With the significant differences between the Shiite and Sunni sects 
described earlier in this work, the new Shiite leadership in Iran represented a direct threat to the 
religious authority and legitimacy of the Saudi regime. When Iraq invaded soon after the 
revolution, they did so with the support of the United States. However, shortly after the Reagan 
administration came into office, the U.S. secured the release of the hostages and began 
supporting the Iranians against Saddam Hussein.  
The United States did not switch allegiances in the Iran Iraq war to produce an alternative 
victor, but rather to ensure a stalemate and contain the conflict. With a decisive victory, either 
side could emerge as a potential regional hegemon, and/or become an immediate and credible 
threat to Saudi Arabia. By choosing to support both sides of the conflict, the U.S. policy was 
consistent with its interest in stability throughout the region.  
In 1981, deputy assistant security for Near East and South Asian affairs, Peter Constable, 
alludes to the additional policy objectives that emerged following Nixon’s arrangement with 
Saudi Arabia. In a testimony before congress, he affirms U.S. commitments to promote security 
among friends, assure the security and availability of resources, and the protection of vital 
transportation and communication routes.257 While the themes of strategic value and stability 
remain, the policy language shifts from a stance that seeks to “promote” stability, to one that 
intends to “protect” it.258 The primary difference, instead of only preventing the spread of 
communism, the U.S interest in Middle East stability now extends to protecting the trade of oil 
and the status of U.S. currency. 
U.S. willingness to protect stability does not imply that the U.S. use force in every 
conflict in the Middle East, but it does seem to intentionally portray force as an option.259 
Perhaps, by presenting itself as a credible threat, the United States seeks to deter any regimes 
ambitions to become a regional hegemon, and/or discourage international competitors from 
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encroaching on this sphere of influence.260 At the very least, the U.S. continues to show a 
willingness to continue its policy of supplying military and financial aid to friendly regimes long 
after the Cold War, providing them with the necessary resources to maintain their own stability.  
The strategy the U.S. deploys in the region is primarily diplomatic, using political capital 
and its credibility as a military threat as a tool to develop security based relationships to create a 
stable environment that will not threaten U.S. interests. Since regimes in the region have to 
constantly balance interests of the state with those of competing identities, they face consistent 
threats at both the domestic and state level. As a result, U.S. propositions of financial and/or 
military aid to promote stability are attractive to many regimes, and Egypt is no exception. Egypt 
is essential for U.S. interests in the region because of two vital geopolitical characteristics of the 
state. First, its proximity to Israel. Second, the Suez Canal.   
Israel is important to the United States because of its relatively stable, western friendly 
government. The role the U.S. played in Israel’s conception means that they invested a 
substantial amount of political capital in the Jewish states’ survival.  Originally, the U.S. hoped 
to improve its image in the region by broking a deal to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue. 
While this U.S. goal remains elusive, the situation is just as likely to erode U.S. political capital 
as it is to yield it. However, the U.S. is likely to continue these attempts because the practice of 
holding talks, with Egyptian mediators present, because they raise the political capital of all 
parties involved. The very perception of seeking a solution adds to the domestic and international 
legitimacy of the regimes that participate. Egypt’s continued role as a neutral arbiter since 1979, 
affirms their significance in U.S. policy towards the region.261 
  In the early 1980’s, the U.S. saw Anwar Sadat’s pro-western realignment of Egyptian 
foreign as an important step towards stability in the region. The U.S. no longer had to deal with 
the anxiety of the rise of a Pan-Arab state that could contend for the position of regional 
hegemon, or worry about becoming an ally Egypt of the communists. When Sadat signed the 
peace accord with Israel, the U.S. saw their stability effort materializing. However, the 
assassination of Sadat once again reminded regional state actors of the relevance of identity, and 
acted as another turning point in U.S., Arab, and Israeli relations.262   
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While the peace treaty with Israel continues to be unpopular domestically, being arbiter 
for Arab-Israeli negotiations is one of many benefits that Egypt extracts from this arrangement. 
Given that Israel and Egypt are the two primary recipients of U.S. aid in the region, it is clear 
that the U.S. put great value on peace and cooperation between the two states. Furthermore, since 
Israel is the primary target of religious discontent in the region, Egypt can carefully use this 
leverage to temporarily divert domestic grievances. Contrarily, the military regime can cooperate 
discretely with U.S. and Israeli counterparts to identify and pursue mutual threats. The duality of 
the Egyptian regime is necessary to manage the local discontent associated with cooperation with 
U.S. and Israel, while also reassuring the two states that it is committed to upholding the peace 
and maintaining stability.263 
Egypt also play an important role in the global economy because the Suez Canal is a vital 
trade artery that connects the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, and 
eventually the Atlantic. As mentioned earlier, Egypt maintains its sovereignty over sea lane, but 
a Multi-national force works with the Egyptian military to oversee day-to-day operations, 
ensuring the security and efficiency of trade through the canal. For the United States, it is critical 
to the welfare of the oil trade and the global economy. The presence of the multi-national force 
was the result of the peace treaty signed with Israel, and this affiliation is significant because it 
affirms the commitment of external states to the Egyptian-Israeli peace and the protection of the 
Suez. The coalition of external international actors also advances Egypt’s security interests by 
acting as a deterrent against potential foreign invaders.  
The U.S. seeks to counter the rise of any regional hegemon that could potentially threaten 
the transportation of the resource to the global economy. The most significant threat to the U.S. 
is the potential of Iranian hegemony in the Middle East. The reason lies in Iran’s relationship 
with Russia, its sectarian-based hostilities with Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. dollar’s connection to 
the oil trade. As mentioned in the section on Saudi Arabia, Iraq’s population consists of a large 
Shi’ite majority. With a government that is now dominated by Shi’ites, it is possible that Iran 
could have significant influence over Baghdad. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves exist 
within a territory occupied by its Shi’ite minority. Due to Saudi Arabia’s small military in 
relation to Iran’s, the Kingdom is extremely vulnerable to invasion and/or an Iranian-backed 
Shi’ite insurrection. With current U.S. allies controlling much of the world’s oil production, 
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trade of the resource in U.S. dollars will continue. However, if Saudi Arabia were to lose control 
over its oil reserves, the fate of the U.S. dollar would be in jeopardy. This is due to their 
combined percentage of the world’s daily oil production. (See Figure 2) A primary threat to U.S. 
security and economic interests involves the potential use of an alternative currency in the global 
oil trade. This would have the effect of turning the U.S. dollar into a fiat currency, meaning not 
backed by a physical commodity.264 With the U.S. debt nearing 20 trillion dollars, such a 
scenario would be detrimental for the U.S. economy.265  
 
(Figure 2) 
266 
 
Although the scenario might seem unlikely, states do not ignore such risks to their 
survival. This is the reason for U.S. security assurances to Saudi Arabia, and why good relations 
with Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt are a crucial of U.S. policy in the region. While direct 
cooperation between the three states might be limited and/or conditional, the states play an 
important role in U.S. attempts to prevent Iranian hegemony.267 Through these security based 
relationships, the U.S. has the influence and the capabilities to protect its interests in the region.  
By allowing the removal of Mubarak, the U.S. was not necessarily ignoring its security 
obligations to allies in the region. While it may temporarily damage their credibility, it does 
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reveal limitations regarding the extent of U.S. commitments and suggests that the U.S. will only 
intervene if it is crucial to protecting U.S. interests. Given the history of regional animosity 
associated with external intervention, U.S. distancing from the Egyptian military’s forceful 
removal of Mohammed Morsi is understandable due to the potential destabilizing consequences 
associated with the perception of their involvement/endorsement of a military coup. Despite 
delays in the delivery of some military equipment, the U.S. did recently resume aid to Egypt, 
implying a level of comfort with the state’s current political situation.268 The continuation of 
military political dominance in Egypt does little to change the circumstance of the relationship; 
thus, the effects of the revolution on U.S. interests appear to be minimal. While the demands of 
international legitimacy require the U.S. to support democratic movements throughout the world, 
U.S. aid to Egypt, particularly to the Egyptian military, reflects its interests in protecting stability 
and the status of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis the oil trade.269  
 
Conclusion 
 
A theme throughout this work is the importance of influence and legitimacy in the 
stability of Middle Eastern regimes. When a state is unable to secure interests and meet the 
demands of the state, local populations will sometimes mobilize behind their religious and 
cultural affiliations to express grievances. While the stability of the Saudi state relies on religious 
legitimacy in collaboration with government subsidies from oil wealth, the Egyptian military 
regime uses its position Egyptian society and reputation as a credible military force to wield 
influence. Furthermore, the presence of the Arab League headquarters in Cairo affirms their 
leadership role in the region, making them a significant part of U.S. policy as a diplomatic 
conduit between the United States and the Arab world. By upholding the peace with Israel, 
Egypt secures the economic and military aid that allow it a credible force in the region. Egypt 
also establishes itself as a partner in U.S. policy initiatives throughout the region. Peace and 
cooperation between Israel and Egypt, is an anchor of stability that secures the Levant, the Suez 
Canal, and Saudi Arabia’s western flank. Democracy in Egypt is destabilizing because of the 
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perpetual cycle of anxiety and insecurity it would create for both Israel and Saudi Arabia. The 
peace accord with Israel remains widely unpopular among the Egyptian population. In Saudi 
Arabia, the rise of any political party that associates with a religious identity presents itself as a 
potential challenger to Saudi legitimacy vis-à-vis religious authority. Therefore, the return of the 
status quo in Egypt is arguably better for U.S., Saudi, and Israeli interests in the region.  
As a secular institution, the Egyptian military currently presents no immediate ideological 
threat to Israel or Saudi Arabia. Due to recent disagreements regarding current events, there 
appears to be tension between the U.S. government and their allies in Egypt, Israel, and Saudi 
Arabia. Current negotiations with Iran, while disconcerting for U.S. allies, is only an alternative 
strategy the U.S. is exploring in an attempt to reduce hostilities. Furthermore, following two long 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, it appears that the U.S. is temporarily prioritizing attempts to 
strengthen its domestic legitimacy. This might explain the withholding of military aid to Egypt 
and U.S. indecisiveness regarding a current strategy in Iraq and Syria. However, U.S. interests 
require good relations with each state in order to maintain stability. Even if the U.S. continues to 
take a cautious approach to the region, it appears that Russia is willing to advantage, evident by 
their recent dealings with the military regime in Egypt.  
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Chapter: 6 
Interest and Security Going Forward 
  
Given the international interests and investment in Egyptian stability, the current political 
circumstances provide an opportunity for the military establishment to strengthen its position in 
government and society. With the prospect of a Mubarak dynasty no longer present, the military 
exercised its monopoly on the use of force to remove its most formidable political opposition. 
They also succeeded in co-opting important segments of the population and initiating 
international dialogue to secure external sources of aid. Fortunately for the military 
establishment, the current domestic and international climate are conducive to the stability of the 
current regime.  
 
Egypt: Geopolitics of Security 
 
The geopolitical context of Egypt makes comparisons to other states extremely difficult, 
as a unique combination of interests converge at their location. Egypt is currently surrounded by 
a destabilized Gaza strip, Sinai, Libya, and Sudan.270 This creates multiple challenges that make 
the Egyptian security situation truly unique. Throughout history, Egyptian rulers had to be aware 
of their geographic advantages in regards to the ruling the population. With the Mediterranean to 
the north, desert to the west, south, and in the Sinai, Egypt’s natural landscape minimizes the 
threat of foreign invasion. Furthermore, it limits the habitable territory that the regime must 
secure and govern. Given the size of Egypt’s population, the military has to carefully calculate 
when use of force against a domestic threat. The geographical barriers provide the military with 
the means to contain those threats. The military effectively was able to effectively neutralize the 
Brotherhood because the natural landscape restricted the Brothers’ ability to evade security 
forces. Therefore, as long as the regime is able to limit the scope of internal opposition and 
secure foreign sources of aid, they increase their chances of survival.271  
Isolated along the Nile, Egypt’s population is far removed from large quantities of 
external support and propaganda meant to destabilize, allowing security forces to mitigate 
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internal discontent by monitoring information and detaining political agitators.272 Since the 
population is large, but confined, the geographical conditions enable Egyptian security forces to 
respond to discontent without spreading military resources too thin. Here, Egypt deploys the 
First Field Army. This unit is the most senior in the Egyptian military, and contains its elite 
Republican Guard division. The First Field Army specializes in both urban and mechanized 
warfare. The unit also protects the western border with an unstable Libya, the southern border 
with an unstable Sudan, and the west bank of the Suez Canal. As the only military unit with the 
authority to operate within Central Cairo, it also acts as the caretaker of the regime. In October of 
2014, Sisi signed a Presidential decree that put critical civilian infrastructure, including 
universities, under military jurisdiction.273The decree renders public property as “equivalent to 
military facilities”, authorizing the regime to prosecute all crimes on public property in military 
tribunals.274 With this decree, the military can arrest political agitators while avoiding the 
standard judicial processes. As the military’s most elite unit, Figure 3 illustrates the priorities of 
the regime regarding the control of the Egyptian population.  
 
(Figure 3) 
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275 
 
Outside of the primary population centers, Egypt has sovereignty over the desolate Sinai 
Peninsula. Here, it shares a border with Israel and Gaza, and has sovereignty over a land bridge 
that connects two continents (Africa and Asia). At this location, The Second Field Army acts as 
caretaker to the Gaza border crossing, as well as the east bank of the Suez Canal.276 As 
mentioned earlier, plays an important role in global trade.277 So much so, that Nasser 
nationalizing the sea lane made Egypt a target for invasion in 1956. However, the Protocol to the 
Treaty of Peace signed in 1981, established an Egyptian Suez Canal Authority (SCA) and a 
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) to cooperate in canal security.278 The peace accord 
and presence of the MFO at the Suez acts as an additional protection against invasion, as the 
external force would also be taking hostile action against the states represented by the MFO. 
Furthermore, this multinational presence relies upon the existing peace treaty with Israel. 
Therefore, any threat to the peace with Israel, indirectly threatens the existing status of the Suez 
Canal and the security of Egypt.279  
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East of the Suez Canal is the Sinai Peninsula. While the geography of the Sinai acts as a 
buffer from any potential large-scale threats originating from the east, the territory is extremely 
difficult to monitor. This makes Egypt vulnerable to infiltration from small criminal, militant, or 
espionage elements. The Sinai’s proximity to Israel only exacerbates this condition, acting as an 
ideal staging point for asymmetric groups that wish to attack Israel. The result is a constant flow 
of weapons, human traffic, and militant activity that could not only threaten the peace with 
Israel, but compromise the security of the Egyptian state.280 The Second and Third Field Armies 
are estimated around 90,000, with infantry and armored units whose original purpose was to 
protect the state from foreign invasion. However, more recent mandates include securing the 
borders with Israel and Gaza, defending the Arab Gas Pipeline, and managing criminal and 
militant activity within the in the Peninsula.281The peace with Israel limits the amount of forces 
Egypt can deploy in the Sinai. As a result, the military has to communicate all operations and 
activity within the territory to Israel to prevent violating the treaty.   
Egypt’s shared border with both Gaza and Israel puts the country at the crossroads of a 
controversial ideological, religious, and humanitarian debate with many international and 
regional implications.282 While peace with Israel secures Egypt’s access to financial and military 
aid from the United States, the peace with the Jewish state is contrary to Arab sympathy for the 
Palestinian cause. This forces the regime to constantly balance internal political discourse with 
regional security.283 Third and Second Army cooperation with Israel along this border is 
extremely controversial, but an essential element in maintaining the peace.284 Due to Israel’s 
mutual interest in limiting militant activity in the Sinai, the Israelis have given Egypt permission 
to increase the total number of brigades operating in the territory.285  
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Neutralizing Opposition  
 
Immediately after the removal of Mubarak, the military regime needed to address the 
divisions between the business elite and the old military establishment. Unlike the later 
crackdowns on the Brotherhood, handling this opposition was a more delicate matter. The 
holding companies consisted of the most profitable industries in key economic sectors, some of 
which rely upon existing partnerships with foreign investors. As a result, the military did not 
want to dismantle the business elite’s assets for fear of the wider economic implications. 
Furthermore, the business elites proved successful at facilitating growth and attracting foreign 
investments. Therefore, the regime chose to detain only key members of Gamal’s inner circle 
who previously exercised political ambitions. Among three of the top elites detained or sought 
on international arrest warrants were former housing minister Ahmed al-Maghrabi, former 
tourism minister Zuhair Garana, and steel entrepreneur, Ahmed Ezz.286 The Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces (SCAF) also began investigations on other prominent business elites, 
publishing a “blacklist” of suspects to prohibit them from freely disposing of their wealth.287 The 
military allowed some of these individuals to leave the country, leaving their businesses 
relatively intact. As a result, the Bank for International Settlements estimates that foreign banks’ 
liabilities to Egyptian citizens increased by more than $6 billion during the first quarter of 2011 
alone.288 
The precision and selective approach by the military to pursue corruption allegations 
against the business elite is evident in the fact that by September 2012, the Illicit Gains Authority 
within the Justice Ministry referred only 29 of 597 reported cases to the courts. The SCAF also 
made amendments to investment legislation which made it possible to avoid charges of 
corruption, embezzlement, or tax evasion with out of court settlements.289 The military also put 
the General Authority for Investment (GAFI) in charge of building individual cases for such 
offenses. One of the primary roles of the GAFI is promoting investment in Egypt. Not wanting to 
exacerbate an already damaged investment climate, they were in a perfect position to determine 
who was essential and who was expendable. Furthermore, the simplicity of the process allowed 
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the director of GAFI to make and sign individual agreements with the businessperson in 
question. The SCAF amendment not only allowed these out of court settlements to absolve the 
business elite of previous transgressions but also possible future indictments; basically, allowing 
the individual to buy their way back into their positon and continue their usual business 
practices.290 Of course, there were several economic consequences. Numerous strikes occurred 
during and following the unrest, and work stoppages were common as business owners left or 
were under investigation. However, the foreign aspect of these industries and holdings enabled 
them to offset temporary domestic losses and survive the turmoil. Another significant provision 
by SCAF before the removal of Mubarak involved the funding of political parties. The law 
passed in March of 2011, outlawed state funding for political parties. Not repealing this law 
meant that, following the revolution, new parties had to scramble to secure domestic donations 
and support from prominent members of the business elite. Not only did the military 
establishment allow allies among the business elite to sponsor many of these parties, they 
encouraged it. In doing so, the regime gained the capability to compromise the political 
relevance of specific groups with well-placed political allies influencing their funds.291 Through 
careful manipulation and selective legal coercion, the military establishment brought the business 
elite back into the fold with minimal damage to the military regime.  
To ensure stability of the regime following the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
military set out to neutralize the organization by detaining its key members and dismantling its 
financial support network. Prior to the Morsi Presidency, such a move might have been widely 
condemned by the Egyptian population. However, the Brotherhood facilitated their own demise 
by alienating the population and ignoring the stated aims of the revolution.292 The military was 
able to systematically dismantle the organization by detaining key members, and confiscating 
Brotherhood property and businesses. Recently, the Egyptian courts also recently upheld 183 
death sentences against Muslim Brotherhood members, with 125 sentences pending. In addition, 
the court confiscated property of more than 901 members, with approximately another 166 
confiscation orders imminent, and dissolved 169 Brotherhood NGOs.293 President Sisi also 
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signed off on a law on February 24, 2015, that designates the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist 
organization, giving the regime will also be able to freeze the group’s financial assets within the 
country.294 With the Muslim Brotherhood outlawed, much of its leadership detained, and their 
financial network dismantled, it appears that the regime successfully neutralized the organization 
as a political force in the short term.  
 
Securing External Aid 
 
Due to its geopolitical location concerning the flow of resources, much of this work 
emphasized the historical context of the Middle East, and the significance of Egypt’s stability 
regarding the economic interests of other states. Even as far back as ancient Persia, Greece, and 
Rome, Egypt stabilized its local economy through its exports, primarily of grain and textiles. 
Since feeding an empire was crucial for stability, Mediterranean powers provided Egypt with 
significant security guarantees in exchange for access to its resources.295 Today, energy fuels the 
industrialized world, and much of that energy comes from oil. Although Egypt does not produce 
enough oil to even meet its own domestic demands, the Suez Canal remains a vital shipping lane 
in the oil trade and other commodities that affect the global economy.296 Because of the historical 
significance of Egypt’s geopolitical location regarding trade, Egyptian leaders always sought 
external benefactors seeking access or influence over the flow of resources. President Sisi and 
the current military establishment are no exception.  
Currently, unemployment in Egypt is around 13% and an estimated 22% of about 70 
million Egyptians are living below the poverty line. Egypt relies upon foreign assistance to 
stabilize the economy and avoid the potential devaluation of the Egyptian pound. A weaker 
Egyptian pound would lead to further inflation and an increase in food prices, potentially causing 
additional unrest by exacerbating the existing domestic grievances. Therefore, securing external 
sources of aid is critical for the stability of the Egyptian state if the military wants to maintain its 
political power. Throughout the entire period of unrest between 2011 and 2013, the military 
regime was extremely active diplomatically. The level of diplomatic engagement suggests that 
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the military was aware of potential cost and benefits of every action in relation to their 
international relationships. 
As discussed earlier, the military had several reasons not to use force against the initial 
protests. However, the U.S. still made public appeals to the military to exercise restraint when 
attempting to restore order. Since the U.S. is Egypt’s primary benefactor, the military likely takes 
these appeals seriously, as aid is a crucial pillar of regime stability. According to the CIA World 
Factbook, in 2012, expenditures in Egypt USD 77.71 billion, while economic revenue was 
around USD 50.1 billion.297 Without external aid, the regime would likely be unable to sustain 
the political influence and legitimacy necessary to stabilize the economy, maintain security, and 
govern.298  
When the Muslim Brotherhood began making aggressive political maneuvers, the 
military had to weigh the potential cost of allowing the Brotherhood to continue to operate with 
the consequences of removing them by force. The military decided to prioritize the immediate 
threat to their government by removing the Brotherhood by force. The military likely expected 
condemnation from the United States, but perhaps not their threats to suspend aid. However, the 
immediate response from Saudi Arabia, U.A.E, and Kuwait to pledge 12 billion (plus whatever 
the U.S. withheld) suggests that the Egyptian military was already consulting with the Gulf 
States about such a scenario. Even Israel opposed the U.S. threat, reminding the Obama 
administration and congress that a suspension of aid would risk further destabilization. Also 
siting the numerous potential security implications of an unstable Egypt, the Gulf States justified 
their support for Egypt while the military continued its crackdowns on the Brotherhood.299 
The implications of the U.S. threat are now becoming apparent in Egyptian foreign 
policy, as President Sisi recently secured two high-profile arms deals with the French and the 
Russians. The “no strings attached” 2 billion dollar arms deal with the Russians also suggests 
that other regional actors, like Saudi Arabia, helped negotiate the transaction.300 The French 
involves the purchase of 24 modern Rafale fighter jets, and a multi-mission capable frigate with 
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short and medium range missile delivery capabilities. The estimated value of the deal is 5.2 
billion euros. The French are allowing Egypt to pay through a lending companies, with French 
banks financing 50% of the deal.301 While France and Russia have a long history of selling 
military hardware to Egypt, the timing is significant because of the status of this U.S. 
administration’s relations with its allies in the Middle East. As mentioned earlier, Israel and 
Saudi Arabia are particularly perturbed by the lack of U.S. involvement in Syria, the initiation of 
nuclear talks with Iran, and its threats to cut back its aid to Egypt. In Egypt, the military regime 
continues to express frustration with the United States for delaying a deal to provide Egypt with 
4 F-16 fighter jets, and previous U.S. considerations regarding the suspension or reduction of aid 
to Egypt.302 Egypt’s eagerness to secure alternative sources of military hardware, and the 
apparent willingness of the Gulf States to finance some of it, suggests that U.S. allies in the 
region might be losing confidence in the credibility of the U.S. security guarantees.303 304 For 
Egypt and other U.S. allies in the region, renewed hostilities between the United States and 
Russia might be a beneficial international development. If Russian deal with Egypt is a precursor 
for a diplomatic pivot towards the Middle East, the competition for influence in the region could 
relieve U.S. leverage and provide regimes with additional options in their pursuit of economic 
and security interests.305 
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Currently, the so called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is positioning itself as a 
threat to every state with interests in the region. Whether through indirect or direct cooperation, 
the following countries are either committing military and intelligence assets, or providing 
military aid and logistical support to fight ISIS: Syria, Libya, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, 
Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, along with a U.S. coalition of 
NATO allies that include Britain, France, Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Poland, and 
Denmark.306 ISIS also made a fair share of asymmetric enemies include The Free Syrian Army, 
Kurdish militias, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda and its affiliates.  
ISIS formed out of the Arab Spring movement in Syria which first began to deteriorate 
into civil war back in 2011. While highly debated, ISIS likely received funding, training, and 
military support from many of the state-actors previously mentioned during initial efforts to 
support rebels fighting the Assad regime.307 While the purpose of this work is not to debate the 
cause of ISIS, the group’s presence is significant due to the regional implications it has on 
stability and the Islamic identity. Originally, many regional actors and their populations 
contemplated involvement against ISIS. However, regional condemnation is growing among 
Islamist and seculars alike, as the group continues to exhibit a willingness to target civilians and 
distribute propaganda displaying their atrocities against captives.308  
As the current regime continues its campaign to neutralize the Brotherhood’s political 
influence and restore stability, the region is now transfixed with the emergence of ISIS. The 
combination of these events creates a current geopolitical context similar to what The Free 
Officers Movement experienced in 1952. In both cases, the head of state’s removal by the 
military coincided with the introduction of a common regional threat, Israel in ’52 and ISIS 
today. In response to this threat, Nasser used Pan-Arab nationalism as a platform to try to unite 
Arab states against Israel. Similarly, President Sisi recently called for the establishment of a Pan-
Arab coalition to fight ISIS and other common threats in the future.309 Like Nasser, President 
Sisi is also showing a willingness to defy the United States, first with the crackdowns against the 
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Brotherhood, and then with unilateral strikes against Islamic militants in Libya.310 Furthermore, 
with escalating tensions between the U.S. and Russia, President Sisi’s recent arms deal with 
Russians is yet another example of Egypt displaying its autonomy in a way that is reminiscent of 
the early Cold War.  
After WWII, the Middle East consisted of young states struggling to pursue interests and 
establish legitimacy to survive the transition away from colonialism and empire. What makes the 
present geopolitical context unique, is that the Arab Spring and the emergence of ISIS occurred 
in a regional system with well-established governments and regional relationships. Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, the Gulf States, Israel, and Turkey, while not formally aligned, were all positioning 
themselves to oppose a potential growing threat from Iran.311312 However, in the last five years 
new heads of state came to power in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Iran, and Israel. Combined 
with the Arab Spring protests, the civil war in Syria, and ISIS, the instability around the region 
led to many unexpected shifts in regional dynamics. Qatar defied Saudi Arab, pledging support 
and aid for the short-lived Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt. Turkey is suddenly 
increasing its anti-Israeli rhetoric and allowing the violent Islamist group, Hamas, to take refuge 
in Turkey since being pushed out of Damascus.313 Bordering both Iraq and Syria, Turkey is also 
hesitant to engage the ISIS to avoid becoming a target, and because ISIS is fighting Turkey’s 
historical Kurdish enemy.314 Iran is engaging ISIS in Iraq, and the Iranian backed group 
Hezbollah, continues to fight ISIS in Syria as well as revolutionary groups looking to overthrow 
Assad. Smaller states, like the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, were contemplating their level 
of involvement; however, following strong international condemnation of ISIS following the 
execution of the captured Jordanian pilot, both countries reaffirmed their commitment to the 
conflict.315   
In Egypt, the ISIS situation is now a domestic issue, as militant Islamists in the Sinai and 
neighboring Libya recently swore allegiance to the group. An ISIS affiliate in Libya recently 
released video footage showing the execution of 21 Coptic Christian migrant workers from 
Egypt. President Sisi responded by ordering airstrikes, and support for the Egyptian military 
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remains high. In the Sinai, militants claim allegiance to the rival groups al-Qaeda and ISIS, both 
claiming responsibility for several attacks on military personnel and checkpoints.316 While the 
presence of militants in the Sinai is nothing new, Islamist groups across the region condemned 
Egypt’s crackdown on the Brotherhood, and the porous border with an unstable Libya only 
exacerbates the security situation in Egypt. However, talks between Israel and Egypt regarding 
the Rafah border crossing and reports of increased Israeli/Egyptian cooperation in the Sinai 
suggest the two states identify mutual interests in securing the desolate terrain.317  
For the military establishment and President Sisi, the ISIS situation provides a unique 
opportunity to deflect any internal opposition, gain additional domestic support, and reassert 
Egypt’s leadership role in the region. The recent arms acquisitions suggest that President Sisi is 
preparing to do just that. The Russian deal consists of small arms to upgrade and supply 
Egyptian ground troops, while the additional Rafales will considerably enhance Egyptian air 
support capabilities. Furthermore, the French frigates have short to medium range missile 
capabilities that will allow Egypt to engage targets in the Sinai from the Mediterranean and/or 
Red Sea.318 Of course, acquiring such capabilities represents a potential threat to Israel; however, 
Israel did not object to this arms deal as they have in the past. This is encouraging because the 
use of these weapons against militants in the Sinai will require substantial cooperation between 
the two states. However, because Israel remains extremely unpopular among the population, 
cooperation will have to be discreet. The regime will need to conduct high-profile attacks and 
continue to publically lobby for Pan-Arab cooperation against Islamic militants. Doing so might 
reassure Egyptians that the military is addressing the threat. As past Arab conflicts attest, the 
public responds positively to Presidents that elevate Egypt’s prestige by taking a leadership role 
in the region.319 However, President Sisi must approach the Arab unity issue delicately. If Egypt 
expends too much political capital, and the establishment of a coalition fails, it could have a 
negative effect on public opinion and regime legitimacy. If the regime is able to adequately give 
the perception of leadership, keep terrorist attacks in Cairo to a minimum, and respond 
successfully to threats developing in Libya and in the Sinai, it could significantly bolster public 
support for President Sisi and solidify the legitimacy of the military regime. 
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While a majority of Egyptians associate with the Islamic identity. Following recent 
events with the Muslim Brotherhood, the ISIS threat brings back the debate regarding the role of 
political Islam in the government. The Egyptian Judicial system already incorporates elements of 
Islamic law, and the popular al-Nour party currently represents Islamist interest in the Egyptian 
political system.320 With this presence of Islamic involvement in politics, there appears to be 
little demand amongst the population to invite the Brotherhood back into the political process.321 
This does not suggest that the Islamic identity is now a less important part in Egyptian society, 
but how recent events concerning the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS shape the debate around 
political Islam remains to be seen.  
The current public animosity towards the Brotherhood, the increased presence of militant 
activity in the Sinai, and the brutality of ISIS could produce a dampening effect on aspirations 
for a broader Islamist identities. Such a scenario might involve Islamists in Egypt condoning the 
actions of the military, or adopting a more moderate political approach now that they have the 
opportunity/responsibility to represent the Islamic identity in government. Contrarily, if these 
Islamists come off as too hardline or too moderate, the inability to adequately represent the 
Islamic community could lead to more discontent. The military needs to remain inclusive and 
aware of the needs of both moderate Islamists and secular reformists alike. The challenge for the 
military will be how to give these groups small, yet significant political victories that allow them 
to remain popular and legitimize the current political situation. At the moment, the Egyptians 
appear comfortable with Islamic influences in government, so long as the secular military 
continues to provide oversight. If this is indeed the case, it is once again contrary to democratic 
norms where civilian governments exercise authority over the military. This interesting dynamic 
between the population and the military regime, combined with the unique structure of the state, 
suggests that a transition to democratic governance might have negative short-term effect on the 
economy, security, and international relationships.  
Conclusion 
 
The history of the region and the formation of suprastate identities created the foundation 
for the present structure of the Egyptian regime. Empire of different origins attempted to govern 
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a vast territory with several important population centers surrounded by less economically and 
politically significant rural communities. For the sake of efficiency and stability, most of these 
communities were left to govern themselves with a certain level of autonomy. Before the rise of 
Islam, they did occasionally adopt cultural and religious traditions from external influences, but 
were never forced to assimilate. As a result, they maintained their ethnic, tribal, and linguistic 
affiliations. With the advent of Islam, communities still were loyal to those entities but were able 
to periodically unify behind their common religion to resist regional intervention from foreign 
actors.  
The colonial period crippled the political and economic infrastructure of the Ottoman 
Empire and its many provinces. Fierce competition in the new European state system caused the 
countries to aggressively pursue interests within the various provinces. Politically, they co-opted 
landowning elites, then exploited the economy by streamlining the production of specific 
resources that reflected their own interests. In doing so, their compromised their political and 
economic infrastructure at the expense of Ottoman legitimacy. By the time external forces 
introduced the state system after WWI and WWII, new independent regimes were left with a 
combination of military hardware, and devastated political and economic institutions. Under 
these circumstances, regimes had to develop policies to unite their populations and legitimize 
their rule.  
For Egypt, this involved a dual strategy to secure interests. The use of aggressive 
autonomy and appeals to popular identity. The approach led to the consolidation of power 
through political restructuring and the nationalization of economic resources. To stabilize the 
economy and legitimize their political dominance, the military regime had to expand its 
influence in the region and then use this influence to secure external sources of aid.  
Since Nasser, Egyptian leaders employed a similar strategy to solidify domestic authority 
through the extraction of economic resources and security concessions from the international 
system.322 In a bi-polar international system, Nasser was able to exercise autonomy and secure 
resources by making himself a symbol of Arab nationalism. By asserting Egypt’s position of 
leadership, the state became an indispensable element in U.S. and Soviet policy in the region.323 
With Nasser’s death, Anwar Sadat had to secure his own legitimacy. He did so by moving away 
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from the socialist policies associated with nationalism, securing the flow of external economic 
and military resources by appealing to U.S. interests. By brokering a peace with Israel, Sadat did 
initially gamble with Egyptian credibility in the Arab world. However, his decision became the 
linchpin of current Egyptian economic and security interests.324Through this peace, Sadat’s 
predecessor Hosni Mubarak, derived legitimacy by acting as a bridge between the Middle East 
and the United States. Since then, nearly all diplomatic initiatives in the region continue to go 
through Cairo. This enabled Egypt to remain instrumental in the region, allowing the state to 
secure external aid while reestablishing its positon of leadership in the Arab world.325 
When the Soviet Union dissolved, Mubarak reaffirmed Egyptian significance to its U.S. 
benefactor via the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the pursuit of al-Qaeda.326 This not only allowed 
Mubarak to secure a steady flow of U.S. aid in the wake of the Cold War, but it lead to an 
increase of security cooperation with Jordan, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. The arrangement also 
gave the Egyptian military an opportunity to purge the its population of Islamist discontents and 
political opponents under the guise of fighting “extremists”.327  
While many view Egypt’s modern leaders as vastly different, the strategies they 
employed to pursue interests and secure legitimacy are similar. Nasser secured economic and 
military resources by taking advantage of competing superpowers, also allowing him to build 
legitimacy by promoting Pan-Arab identity and nationalism. Conversely, Sadat appealed to the 
growing Islamist community through a combination of rhetoric and domestic initiatives, seeking 
to mitigate opposition to controversial policies directed at securing state interests. While Sadat 
lost his life at the hands of the Islamists, the regime and its policies survived.  
Like Nasser and Sadat before him, Mubarak’s approach was a continuation of their 
strategy to advance state interests by securing external security and economic resources. With a 
tighter grip on economic and political institutions, there was less of a need for the regime to 
adopt an identity. Instead, the regime had to only monitor and occasionally satisfy popular 
identities. For a time, Mubarak accomplished this through Sadat’s peace with Israel. Through the 
peace, Egypt secured continual aid from the U.S. and it established itself as a significant member 
of the peace negotiations between the Israel and the Palestinians. As the de facto representative 
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of “Arab” interests to the west, Mubarak made the military regime vital to the U.S. regional 
policy.328 
The unrest that led to the replacement of Mubarak did little to disrupt the military 
political and economic infrastructure.  Since the military establishment is much larger than one 
figurehead, they also revealed an ability to preserve political and economic power despite the 
removal of the executive. The fact that the political unrest targeted the Mubarak family, and not 
the military regime, suggests that the military remains a respected institution in society. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the military will have to use force against a mobilized Egyptian 
population. Instead, they can politically sacrifice a few individuals to preserve the military 
regime and ride out political turmoil by posturing as neutral arbiters. The use of force is a 
calculated measure directed only at specific elements of opposition that pose a threat to the 
infrastructure of the military-dominated regime. So long as they secure an element of popular 
support from other segments of the population, the use of force remains a justifiable option to 
protect their position in society. This is evident in their handling of the Arab Spring. The military 
oversaw the peaceful removal of Mubarak, encouraged the formation of political parties, and 
then portrayed their action against Morsi as an instrument of popular demand. This approach 
suggests that the military wants to convince the population that political alternatives still exist. In 
this way, the military limits the strength of all opposition by dividing the population between 
those who seek to politically influence change, and those that seek to force it.  
By leaving the structure of the bureaucracy intact, the regime upholds the public 
perception of their neutrality. Furthermore, their current cooperation with the al-Nour Islamist 
party portrays an element of political inclusiveness that the Brotherhood lacked.329 Throughout 
the turmoil and up to the present, the military continues to display political savvy by using a 
combination of patience, inclusiveness, and calculated force. In doing so, they gradually 
removed Mubarak and politically outmaneuvered the Brotherhood. With the 2011 legislation that 
requires political parties to acquire funding from within the state, the military also puts the purse 
of new political parties in the hands of co-opted power brokers.330 Without the legitimacy and 
experience of the military, these political entities are unlikely to outmaneuver the regime or 
become influential enough to force significant political change in the short term.   
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Since the turmoil from 2011 to 2013, the military establishment succeeded in avoiding a 
potential Gamal Mubarak Presidency and eliminated the Muslim Brotherhood as a viable 
political opposition. By inviting specific business elites back into the fold, they also preserved 
their economic and institutional fiefdoms. The Suez Canal remains secure, and the military is 
increasing its cooperation with Israel. While the U.S. continues to withhold specific elements of 
aid to the regime, current instability in Iraq and Syria will likely diminish the salience of their 
actions against the Brotherhood. Even with a reduction of U.S. military resources, Saudi Arabia, 
the Gulf States, Russia, and France all displayed a willingness to fill that void.  
Due to the Suez Canal, border with Israel, and position of leadership in the region, Egypt 
will remain a relevant state in the Middle East. This relevance means that external actors will 
continue to have an interest in Egypt’s stability. The military establishment’s ability to navigate 
the recent turmoil in Egypt displayed their stability as an institution, as well as their political, 
diplomatic, and military competence. This stability and competence reaffirmed their legitimacy 
as an institution and governing body, enabling it to pacify the internal discontent. Of course, 
democracy in Egypt is not impossible. However, the inability of the Arab Spring to force this 
change suggests that it will require a combination of a military willingness to relinquish control, 
and external incentives to encourage such a transition. For the time being, external actors are 
providing aid to help stabilize the current regime; therefore, the military establishment is likely 
to maintain their political and economic influence over the Egyptian state. 
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